

THE  
BLOW  
FROM  
BEHIND

CHAMBERLIN

THE BLOW FROM BEHIND  
A DEFENCE OF THE  
FLAG IN THE  
PHILIPPINES



DS  
685  
.C43

FRED C. CHAMBERLIN

LEE AND  
SHEPARD







# THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

OR

SOME FEATURES OF THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST MOVEMENT  
ATTENDING THE WAR WITH SPAIN

TOGETHER WITH

A CONSIDERATION OF OUR PHILIPPINE POLICY

FROM ITS INCEPTION TO THE PRESENT TIME

*AND THE INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW AFFECTING  
THE SAME*

BY

FRED C. CHAMBERLIN, LL.B.



BOSTON  
LEE AND SHEPARD  
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THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

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*Dedication*

TO

MAJ. GEN. O. O. HOWARD

*U. S. A., Retired*

THE MAN WHOSE SINGLE AIM  
IS TO MAKE OTHERS HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS,  
AND WHO, BY HIS EXAMPLE, FIRST  
TAUGHT ME FRIENDSHIP,  
THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED

WOLLASTON,

*Christmas Eve, 1902*





## PREFACE

This volume is made up of the complete manuscript which was prepared as the foundation of the address delivered by the author upon Memorial Day, 1902, before Stannard Post No. 2, G. A. R., at Burlington, Vt., and of such additions as have been necessary in order that the work might comprehend the entire period of the Philippine Insurrection, so called. The distribution of a limited number of galley slips of the address about as delivered, of course covering much less ground than is herein considered, received such enthusiastic comments and so much attention from leading newspapers, although the slips were sent out too late to be considered news, as to seem to warrant the publication of this volume. Had it not been for the congressional campaign of last fall we would have published long before this. The author's desire, however, to make this an American book, and not a party one, has rendered delay inevitable until he deemed that

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the Philippine question had really ceased to be an important subject of dissension between the two prominent parties and had become a question with which we were willing to deal as a nation. To the writer's mind that time has now arrived.

At first, those who read these pages will probably be intensely surprised to learn that the literature of the Anti-Imperialists was so largely made up of ridiculous exaggerations, barefaced misquotations, misrepresentations and falsehoods, and to learn that an individual who has gained a national reputation as a statistician would stoop to such methods to prove his points; and yet, to the mind of the author of this book, such indefensible methods are the most likely weapons in the world to be employed by American men who can see nothing wrong in encouraging a public enemy to shoot down American soldiers. In passing, it may also be properly observed that if a person's statistics are taken at their face value it seems easy for anyone to obtain a national reputation as a statistician. Perhaps this indicates the explanation of the reputation of at least one man.

The conviction, based upon purely psychological grounds and after much thought, was forced upon

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me that such men would do anything to gain their point—that they were outside the pale that covers sound, careful, considerate, responsible minds, and that, therefore, we must, in whatever they do, look for everything and anything that is unjustifiable, unfair, and irresponsible—and the disclosures herein set out of their work support strongly this theory—and it was this belief that led to the minute examination contained in this book of the literature and statistics presented to the country by the Anti-Imperialists.

The discovery of the fact that there are practically no men among the Anti-Imperialists who ever carried a musket in war, although the most of them were, at the time of the Civil War, of enlistment age, was also the result of reasoning and reflection, and not of any mere chance.

The author has hope that there will be many people in the country who will be glad that this book has been written. He will be especially pleased if it is welcomed by those who are or have been American soldiers and by those who are especially interested in them, for he will then feel as if he had done something for them. That is what, above all else, he desires to accomplish ; and he seeks no

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other reward nor, indeed, is any other conceivable, for the many hours which the preparation of this volume has consumed than the satisfaction which the fulfillment of this desire would bring to him.

F. C. C.

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# THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

## CHAPTER I

### DEWEY AND OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

#### HOW CAREFULLY WE PREPARED FOR MANILA BAY

ON the 27th of January, 1898, about three weeks before the destruction of the *Maine*, a cable message was sent by the Navy Department to Commodore Dewey, who commanded our Asiatic Squadron, directing him to retain all of his men whose enlistments had expired. On February 25th, Mr. Roosevelt, then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, sent another cable to Dewey directing him to assemble his fleet at Hong Kong at once, to retain the *Olympia*, which had been previously ordered back to San Francisco, and to be thoroughly prepared for offensive operations in the Philippine Islands in case of war with Spain.

On the following day, Dewey was ordered to

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fill every bunker of his fleet with the best coal he could obtain. On the 3rd of March the *Mohican* was sent to Honolulu from San Francisco with a cargo of shot, shell and powder, and the *Baltimore* was ordered from China to meet her at Honolulu, transfer that cargo to her own lockers and then steam for Hong Kong as fast as she could.

On the 19th of April, a great day in American history, since 1775, and a day that will be as great in the annals of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, for it will mark the beginning of the struggle that gave them their freedom, as it does that of the struggle that gave us ours, Congress passed the resolution declaring war with Spain; and that night five hundred American sailors climbed over the sides of our fleet in the far-away harbor of Hong Kong, and proceeded to daub a new coat of dark, dirty, drab paint over the snow-white that had covered our ships for thirty years.

Two days later, on the 21st of April, the *Baltimore*, with her great load of ammunition, came rolling into Hong Kong, clear from Honolulu, her race against time well won. Her precious cargo was divided up with the greatest haste among all of our ships; and the *Baltimore* was put into dry-

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dock, cleaned, painted and floated out, all in forty-eight hours' time. On that very day, England notified the United States that, under the international laws of neutrality, Dewey must leave Hong Kong. He was ready and, although he had the right to take twenty-four hours, he took one, and left at two o'clock that very afternoon, moving about thirty miles from British jurisdiction into purely Chinese waters. Here, two days later, on April 26th, there was flashed around the world to him, this message:

"DEWEY, Asiatic Squadron:

"War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

"LONG."

And the next day Dewey started for Manila. Not a moment had been lost; and, when the time came for the struggle, there we were, waiting, in perfect condition, without a thing left undone. It is a record of which to be proud.

It is unnecessary to state, at any length, what happened in Manila harbor on May 1, 1898. In

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four or five hours' time, every ship of the Spanish squadron was sunk to the bottom of the bay and hundreds of their men killed, while we never lost a single sailor and had only eight men wounded, and they all slightly and by one shell; and three hundred years of Spanish rule over 10,000,000 people had gone up in the smoke of American powder and we had lopped off, by the first blow of the war, a clean third, both in population and in area, of the great Spanish Empire.\*

### DEWEY'S PROBLEMS AFTER MANILA BAY

What was Dewey's situation after the battle? No power in the Philippines could resist him within the range of his guns. By a word from him he might perhaps secure the surrender of the

\* The entire Spanish Empire, before Manila Bay, was composed as follows: Spain, 191,100 square miles and 17,550,246 people; the Philippines, 114,326 square miles and 10,000,000 people; Caroline Islands, 2944 square miles and 234,046 people; Cuba with 43,220 miles and 1,521,684 population; Balearic Islands, 1860 miles and 262,893 people; the Canary Islands with 2808 miles and 287,728 people, and Porto Rico with 3530 miles and 807,708 population—a grand total of 359,788 square miles and 30,664,305 people—one-third of which is 119,929 square miles and 10,221,435 people, and the Philippines have 114,326 square miles and 10,000,000 of people.

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city of Manila with its some 250,000 people, with all its great wealth and even of its army of 14,000 Spanish veterans who garrisoned it. A single message from Dewey to the Spanish Governor-General to the effect that the former would bombard the town unless it and its garrison capitulated at once, might have brought the two to Dewey's feet.

Dewey was all alone. He had no communication with his government. The Spaniards held both ends of the only cable from the islands, and all Dewey could do was to cut it and tie the severed ends to two barrels floating in the harbor where he could keep watch of them.

So long as he remained there on guard, he knew he held that Spanish army where it could not strike a blow at us anywhere else. It could only leave on Spanish ships while he was there, and the Spanish ships were all under water. Is there any doubt but that Dewey ought to have remained just where he was, retaining every bit he had won, and improving every new opportunity to inflict further injury on Spain? This was a war in which Dewey was engaged. He knew the advantage he had gained. He knew that he would have been

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court-martialed if he had relinquished it. What would have been done to Grant if, after mastering the fortifications of Richmond, he had turned around and run away? Dewey's problem was the same. This was a war and wars are won by surrenders like that of Manila and its garrison, an army of 14,000 troops, that guard an empire and by the fall of Santiago with 25,000 more.

Dewey knew this. He knew what an awful blow it would be for Spain to have to surrender to him Manila and its garrison. But he could not try to inflict that blow; he could not catch the hare; he could only watch the hole. If Manila and its 14,000 troops had been offered to him on a golden salver he would have had to refuse them. He could not accept the surrender of anything.

### WHY DEWEY COULD NOT ACCEPT THE SURRENDER OF MANILA

Why?—because, by the terms of international law, the United States was obliged, if it accepted the surrender of Manila and its great garrison, to take care of them both,—to govern that city of 250,000 people, to establish and maintain order in it, to protect the lives and property of all the

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people therein, both foreigners and peaceful natives, to establish courts of justice, and to treat and guard these 14,000 Spanish soldiers as prisoners of war,—and Dewey could not spare a man for that purpose from his hot decks. Thousands of extra men were needed to do this work that would have fallen upon us the moment Manila and its garrison capitulated. There was no way we could escape that liability to every other nation in the world who had citizens there.

### THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THIS POINT

Here are the leading authorities upon that point.

Probably the greatest work on international law that has been written in the last half century is from the pen of Calvo, the eminent Frenchman.

In Vol. II, Ch. Calvo, *Le Droit International* (2d edition), at pp. 301-2, § 999, he quotes with approval, our own Chief Justice Marshall, as follows:

“At the moment of the transfer of the territory, the relations of its inhabitants with the former sovereign dissolve themselves. The same act that transfers the ownership of the soil transfers the loyalty of the people who continue to remain there.”

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That is, as soon as the territory of Manila were actually transferred to the keeping of the United States, the United States would become bound to protect the lives and property of all persons in Manila "by all the efforts in . . . (their) power," as Mr. John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, puts it in a letter to Mr. De Onis, March 12, 1818:

"There is no principle of the law of nations more firmly established than that which entitles the property of strangers within the jurisdiction of a country in friendship with their own, to the protection of its sovereign by all the efforts in his power." Whart. Int. Law Dig., Vol. 2, § 201.

Mr. Hannis Taylor, probably the foremost American authority now writing on international law, in his Public International Law, § 570, says, with regard to the liabilities we would have assumed if Dewey had come into actual military occupation of Manila:

"The whole subject (of military authority over hostile territory) has been regulated by Section III of The Hague Second Convention, '*On Military Authority over Hostile Territory*.'

"xx Art. XLII. Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.



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“(Art. XLIII.) The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety.”

This must now be taken as the law. It is the latest agreement among the civilized nations. The last article above is something for us to bear in mind: “The occupant (that is, the United States) shall take all steps in his (their) power to reestablish and insure, so far as possible, public order and safety.” It is part of our text in the Philippines.

Taylor, in § 574, says:

“As Chief Justice Marshall said in a notable case: ‘Although acquisitions made during war are not considered as permanent until confirmed by treaty, yet to every commercial and belligerent purpose, they are considered as a part of the domain of the conqueror, so long as he retains the possession and government of them.’”

And two sections further along, Mr. Taylor says:

“The duty of an occupant to govern the territory of which he is in military possession is correlative to his right to possess himself of it as conqueror, and, as such, to end all forms of pre-

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existing authority. The right of a belligerent to so occupy and govern is one of the incidents of war flowing directly from the laws of war as recognized by usage and as embodied in the laws of nations."

Another statement by high authority is the following from Westlake's Int. Law., Chapter XI, 1st paragraph:

"The peaceable population of an invaded district are entitled to protection for their life, honor, family rights, and religion."

### MILITARY OCCUPATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Taylor, in § 579, gives the following exact statement. It shows the law as it has been since interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, and it also shows what the duties of the President of the United States are with relation to the peoples of such territory. He has no choice in the matter. Remember that when we consider what he did.

"Hostile territory subdued by the armies of the United States does not pass under the dominion either of its constitution or its laws, neither do its inhabitants become citizens or subjects of

## OUR INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS

the same, for the reason that neither the President as Commander-in-chief nor the military officers under his control can enlarge the boundaries of the Union without enabling legislation from Congress itself. . . . Until the status of territory so occupied and that of its inhabitants has been altered by adequate legislation, such territory does not cease to be foreign, nor do its inhabitants cease to be aliens, in the sense in which those words are used in the laws of the United States. (Fleming and Page, 9 How. 603; Cross and Harrison, 16 How. 164.) While such conquered territory is under the sovereignty of the United States it is no part of the Union, and its inhabitants have none of the rights, immunities or privileges guaranteed by law to citizens thereof. . . . While war continues it is the military duty of the President as Commander-in-Chief to provide for the security of persons and property, and for the administration of justice. (The Grape Shop, 9 Wall. 129.) Such government may be carried on under an entirely new code made by the authority of the Commander-in-chief." (Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119.)

Is there any doubt of what we would have done had we been in Dewey's place? I think not. I believe we would have done exactly as he did, and that was to ask for help; and if one of us had been President of the United States we would have done just as Mr. McKinley did,—we would have sent it. It is doubtful if there is a man of common

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sense in the country who would have done differently, or been justified, at the time, in doing differently, had he been in the shoes of either Dewey or Mr. McKinley. The proposition is too plain, too evident for contradiction.

So far, then, we must all agree as to our policy in the Philippines. There can be no division up to this point.

## CHAPTER II

### HOSTILE FLEETS AT MANILA

#### HOSTILE ATTITUDE OF FOREIGN NATIONS—INTERNATIONAL LAW UNDER WHICH THEY ACTED

THE moment Manila Bay cabled its message around the world, all the great nations rushed their men-of-war to that port under forced draft. Each of those nations had many of its own citizens there whose lives and property it was bound to protect.

The international law, under which they were acting in sending their men-of-war to Manila, and the obligation of Spain are defined by the following:

Vattel, the great French authority, says (Vattel, Chitty's edition, Book II, § 104) :

“As soon as he (a foreign sovereign, that is, Spain in this case), admits them (foreigners), he engages to protect them as his own subjects, and to afford them perfect security, so far as depends on him,”

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Mr. John Quincy Adams, when Secretary of State, in a letter to Mr. De Onis (*supra*), March 12, 1818, states the principle in this way:

“There is no principle of the law of nations more firmly established than that which entitles the property of strangers within the jurisdiction of a country in friendship with their own, to the protection of its sovereign by all the efforts in his power.” Whart. Int. Law Dig., Vol. II, § 201.

There is Spain's liability. She was liable for any failure to protect the 60,000 or 70,000 foreigners in Manila “by all the efforts in (her) power.”

Now, as a rule, the foreigners who continually reside in a foreign country that is at war are entitled only to such protection as that to which the native citizens of that country are entitled from their government. But there is a peculiar liability to which eastern governments are subject toward Europeans, that grows out of the fact that Europeans in the East almost never mix with the natives. They live by themselves, usually in a part of the town of their own. At Tientsin, for instance, which was so recently besieged by the Boxers, there are two cities, the Chinese and the

## HOSTILE FLEETS AT MANILA

European settlements. International law regards these Europeans as Europeans still, and the Spanish Government was liable to the home governments of Europeans in Manila for any damage or harm done to them by any failure upon her part to protect them "by all the efforts in (her) power." The best statement I have found of this point is in Lawrence's *Wheaton* (Elem. of Int. Law, § 333, p. 418), as follows:

"The national character of merchants residing in Europe and America is derived from that of the country in which they reside. In the eastern parts of the world, European persons, trading under the shelter and protection of the factories founded there, take their national character from that association under which they live and carry on their trade: this distinction arises from the nature and habits of the countries.

"In the western part of the world, alien merchants mix in the society of the natives; access and intermixture are permitted, and they become incorporated to nearly the full extent.

"But in the East, from almost the oldest times, an immiscible character has been kept up; foreigners are not admitted into the general body and mass of the nation; they continue strangers and sojourners, as all their fathers were. Thus, with respect to establishments in Turkey, the British courts of prize, during war with Holland, determined that a merchant, carrying on trade in

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Smyrna, under the protection of the Dutch consul, was to be considered a Dutchman, and condemned his property as belonging to an enemy. And thus in China, and generally throughout the East, persons admitted into a factory are not known in their own peculiar national character; and, not being permitted to assume the character of the country, are considered only in the character of that association or factory."

### RIGHT OF THE FOREIGN NATIONS TO INTERVENE

In case Spain did not, either because she could not or would not, protect a foreign citizen and his property in Manila, the nation to which that foreigner belonged could step in, come in,—intervene is the legal term,—and protect him herself with her cannon, her ships, her armies, or any other way she might choose. The right of a nation to protect its own citizens anywhere is akin to the highest law,—the law that, when invoked, allows a government to override and overturn every other law made by man or by itself even, the law of self-preservation.

Here are the leading authors for these statements:

Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, § 174, says:

"A part of the general right of self-preservation possessed by every state is the special right



## HOSTILE FLEETS AT MANILA

to protect its subjects abroad, which is correlative to its liability to respond for injuries inflicted upon aliens within its own limits."

At § 198, he continues:

"Nations must hold intercourse with each other, and the right of a state to protect its subjects abroad imposes the reciprocal duty upon it to answer for injuries unlawfully inflicted upon foreigners within its territory and jurisdiction."

That is, "If I may protect my citizens in your country, I'll protect yours in mine."

Hall's Int. Law, § 87, states the principle thus:

"States possess a right of protecting their subjects abroad which is correlative to their responsibility in respect of injuries inflicted upon foreigners within their dominions."

How far a nation may go in protecting its citizens when they are endangered while among a foreign nation, may be judged by the following citations:

Prof. Hoffcutt, of Indiana University, in a treatise styled "International Law for Mob Injuries," says:

"It is the undeniable right of every sovereign state, and to a reasonable extent the duty, as

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well, to protect the persons and the property of its citizens visiting or domiciled in a foreign country, and when they are injured in a manner not warranted by the principles of international law, to intervene in their behalf. If the foreign country permits aliens thus to visit or reside in its territory, it impliedly guarantees them the same measure of safety and protection as is provided for its own citizens. Should it fail in this international duty, in any respect, the government of the injured alien has a just cause for intervention and complaint. The principle was stated concretely by Chief Justice Marshall to be that 'The American citizen who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and temporary allegiance to the country, is yet . . . entitled to the protection of his own government.' (Murray vs. Schooner *Charming Betsy*, 2 Cranch, 120.) This language was adopted as correct by Mr. Webster, then Secretary of State, (vol. 6, Webster's Works, p. 523) . . . and has been since generally approved as embodying an accepted principle of international law and a rule for the guidance of the government of the United States."

Mr. Hall (Int. Law, § 12) states:

"When a state grossly and patently violates international law, in a matter of serious importance, it is competent to any state, or to the body of states, to hinder the wrongdoing from being accomplished, or to punish the wrongdoer, . . . International law being unprovided with the support of an organized authority, the work of police

## HOSTILE FLEETS AT MANILA

must be done by such members of the community of nations as are able to perform it."

### INSTANCES IN WHICH WE INTERVENED

The United States offer several precedents. By seeing what we ourselves do when our citizens are not protected in a foreign country, we in some measure may be able to form an idea of what is to be anticipated of other nations, in a like situation.

In 1853 occurred what is known in international law books as "The Greytown Case."

In that case citizens of the United States had been robbed at Greytown, San Juan. We sent a war ship there to demand redress, and when that was not forthcoming, we destroyed the town, partly by bombardment and partly by a force of marines landed for that purpose. (Vide Whart, Int. Law Dig., § 224.)

For instances known to us all, I need only to call your attention to the fact that we hold Hawaii to-day because we landed our marines there from the *Boston* on the 16th of January, 1893, on the plea that it was to protect American lives and property. The government of that country, it was said, had

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ceased to have sufficient strength to protect our people living there and so we intervened by force. We landed cannon and troops and were ready to do anything that was needed to preserve order.

And, last of all, so recent that the anxiety of it is still vivid in our minds, is the Boxer trouble in China. That is on all-fours with the present questions we have confronting us, from an international standpoint, in the Philippines. China should have protected the foreign legations in Peking and the foreigners throughout the empire. She could have done it if she had exerted herself "by all the efforts in (her) power," as Mr. Adams defines her duty—but she didn't. What was the result? We joined the other nations in intervening by force and, after a number of battles, we rescued our people and then we, together with all the nations whose citizens had been outraged or injured, presented a collective bill of \$333,000,000, which China will be paying, together with four per cent. annual interest thereon, for the next forty years,—this amount to reimburse us with the other participating nations for the expenses we were put to in sending troops over there, and for damages to those individuals whose property had been de-

## HOSTILE FLEETS AT MANILA

stroyed, or injured, and as indemnities to the families of those whose lives had been sacrificed.

In a word, then, these foreign nations who were sending their men-of-war to Manila under all speed were going to protect their countrymen in any way and by any method that became necessary to accomplish that object. The fact that armored ships only were sent shows more than all else how they expected to do their work, if any there were.

As soon as they arrived, they took up stations where they could, in sullen, menacing silence, sleeplessly watch every move we made. Armored vessels and battleships they were, too, against Dewey's unarmored cruisers. The Germans had five of them. Before our troops began to arrive, the Germans and French were nagging Dewey at every opportunity. Dewey proclaimed the port blockaded by him and, by the laws of war, he had the right to lay down reasonable regulations which all nations should observe and which would enable him to effectually carry out that blockade. If he could not make it effectual, it would not hold, according to the same laws, for any nation has a perfect right to totally ignore an imperfect blockade.

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The Germans broke nearly all of Dewey's regulations about as fast as he made them. They moved about in the darkness; on several occasions they tried to run the blockade by putting out their lights; they would follow our transports as close as possible just to spy out to see how many men we had on board; they would not salute the flag of the United States as they passed it.

Dewey sat there in his wicker chair under the muzzle of one of his big guns, never missing any of it, and when the right time came he showed his claws. Two of his messages to the German admiral will go down into history. "Don't pass the American flag again without seeing it" was Dewey's way of calling the Kaiser's representatives' attention to the fact that the German salutes to the American flag had been notably absent for some time, and "Brumby, tell Von Diedrich that if he wants a fight, he can have it right now," when some fresh annoyance from the Germans was added to our admiral's heavy strain.

## CHAPTER III

### DEWEY AND AGUINALDO

#### DANGER FROM AGUINALDO, AND CHARACTER OF HIS FORCES

Soon an additional trouble broke around Dewey's head. This one must have given him more worry than all the rest combined; for there was no way to control it. He was dependent upon luck to escape misfortune from it. Nothing that he could do would direct it or govern it in an appreciable degree; and yet it could snatch away in an instant everything he had gained, and give the hostile powers the very opening for which they were, for all the world like so many cats at a rat-hole, so eagerly watching. All they wanted was an excuse to jump in and seize the rat for themselves. The insurgents, Aguinaldo and his army, were closing in on Manila. They gradually drove in the Spaniards and were likely to take the city. They were treacherous, bloodthirsty and

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ignorant of the laws of war. Dewey was like a man in a powder magazine with 30,000 savages surrounding him, juggling lighted matches in their hands. Any instant they might commit some outrage that would have given the foreign war-vessels in the harbor a decent excuse to intervene. That was what they were there for; to use force if they could find any justification for it. Their hostile attitude shows that plainly enough. They had a perfect right to turn their guns on to the city any moment their consuls or their other citizens were endangered.

Just as we had done at Greytown in 1853, so France or Germany or China or Japan could have done to Manila,—bombarded it the moment it became evident that the insurgents would capture the city, if such a time were to come, as it was evidently recognized by all the nations whose ships were there that massacre and sack would follow a capture of Manila by Aguinaldo; that was what those ships of war of all nations were there for,—exactly that for which they were there. Where should we have been if the other nations had interfered? Until they intervened we would have such a grip on Manila as made it certain that if



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Dewey could obtain enough help from home we would soon have that city and its garrisoning army and the entire Philippines surrender to us. The moment another nation interfered our grip would be gone. Somebody else would snatch it from us and very likely that would be done by a nation hand-in-glove with Spain, to whom the islands might be turned over by the intervening power when the war should be over. We could only protect our position there by another Battle of Manila, our unarmored cruisers against their armored ships. That means that we should have had another war on our hands,—and we were on the brink of a second war every day from the time Dewey sunk the Spanish fleet,—every instant night and day.

Senator Lodge in his admirable work, "The War with Spain," thus describes Dewey's situation:

"In the front was Spain, an open and public enemy . . . On either hand were warships of unfriendly powers, watching sullenly and eagerly for any error, for a sign of weakness, for the least excuse for interference. All around Manila were the insurgents . . . untrustworthy, treacherously led, and capable, at any moment, of action which might endanger our relations with other powers,

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or of intriguing with these same powers against us."

### NECESSARY FOR US TO RESTRAIN AGUINALDO

Dewey's game was to play straight ahead, and he did it to perfection. Before any American troops had arrived, he felt it necessary to hold back Aguinaldo.

Willis John Abbott says in his "Blue Jackets of '98," p. 332:

"Before the arrival of the first expedition from the United States, Aguinaldo had made such progress in arming and organizing the natives that, in a series of engagements around Manila the Spaniards were worsted, losing heavily and being driven into the lines immediately surrounding the city. . . By the last of May, the exultant insurgents were within seven miles of the city, which their lines completely surrounded, and their prisoners numbered almost three thousand. Then the first damper was put upon their enthusiasm by Admiral Dewey himself. Fearing that if the city should be taken by the insurgents, there would result a sack and massacre, which would compel the intervention of the other armed forces in the harbor, he sent word to Aguinaldo that the advance must be stopped. Between the Filipino front and the town lay the Malolele River. . . This stream they were forbidden to cross. 'If you do,' said

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Dewey, 'I will send the *Petrel* into the stream to bombard your lines.' "

### HELP ARRIVES FOR DEWEY

Dewey had to wait all alone a long time. One thing and another delayed the sending of relief and help to him until it was about three months after the Battle of Manila before any American troops arrived; but when they did begin to come in they came rapidly, and by the first of August we had some 7000 or 8000 men there.

Then the load began to lift off Dewey's shoulders a bit. We sent him about the best we had; Merritt, Otis, Lawton and MacArthur. And then one morning a long, black hulk showed up in the harbor carrying some 13-inch guns. It was the monitor *Monterey* from San Francisco. During the very night following the afternoon on which the *Monterey* dropped around just to see what was going on, two of the German war vessels gave up in disgust and went home. Their chance had gone. With the *Monterey* there, Dewey could have held his own with them in any argument that might arise and it was not for that that they were there.

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As soon as the troops stretched their legs on the white sands, Dewey and Merritt determined to complete the subjugation of Spain's eastern possessions and preparations were made for capturing by force Manila and the Spanish army that garrisoned it if they would not surrender peaceably. Aguinaldo had the entire city completely surrounded on the land sides. The first thing to do was to get him out of the way.

This was finally accomplished after a good deal of difficulty, without an open break between the Americans and Aguinaldo, and then Dewey and Merritt moved the American forces up in front of where the Filipinos had placed the intrenchments investing the city. This done, Dewey and Merritt then notified the Spanish Governor that they would bombard and storm the city in forty-eight hours (the advance notice required by international law to be given so as to provide all non-combatants an opportunity to leave the vicinity), unless it be surrendered with the Spanish army which constituted its garrison.

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GOVERNOR OF MANILA SUBJECTS WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO PERILS OF BOMBARDMENT RATHER THAN LEAVE THEM TO AGUINALDO

To this demand, the Spanish Governor made a refusal and, in the course of his reply, said:

“Finding myself surrounded by insurrectionary forces, I am without places of refuge for the increased numbers of wounded, sick, women and children who are now lodged within the walls.”

Here you may get an idea of how the Spanish Governor regarded Aguinaldo. The Governor was afraid to trust his wounded, sick, women or children in the city in the hands of Aguinaldo. He preferred, for their sakes, to subject them to the perils of a joint bombardment and assault of a hostile army. When you hear Aguinaldo spoken of as the George Washington of the Philippines, it might be well to recall this remark of the Spanish Governor-General.

The Spanish refused to capitulate, and as they did not dare to send their sick, wounded, and women and children outside the city where Aguinaldo's army might endanger them, the Spanish Governor kept all these non-combatants within his

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own lines. This made the task of the Americans doubly hard ; but they were equal to it.

Here, in passing, record should be made of one thing that is a pleasant memory. Just as the hour to commence the bombardment arrived, the four British men-of-war hauled up their anchors and solemnly steamed over between the Germans and the Americans, and let their anchors down there, while their bands played "The Star-Spangled Banner." The American sailors cheered this movement to the echo. It was an act of friendship at a time when friends might be needed. It was a little thing; but it told. The Germans would have had to shoot through the English men-of-war before they could have gotten in range of Dewey's ships, unless the latter changed their positions. England was the only friend we had; but, with her, no other was needed.

## MANILA SURRENDERS

Dewey's guns were trained carefully so as to do no further damage than to reduce the Spanish forts, as their dismantling, with the demonstration that the American troops would make on the land, was believed to be sufficient to cause the capitula-

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tion of the city and, of course, the city itself could not be bombarded while it was filled with sick, wounded, disabled and women and children.

When the forts had been reduced, some of the American troops moved forward to take possession of them. One little picture that Abbott draws in his book is well worth quoting. It shows the American soldier at his best.

“At last,” says Abbott, “there was a rattle of musketry from the shore, and, after allowing the smoke to clear away, the men on the ships could see a column of men advancing up the beach toward the fort, in water up to their waists . . . but pressing forward with cheers, with colors waving and with a band stoutly plodding along in their rear, from which there came faintly over the waters, strains of a novel battle song, ‘There’ll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town To-night.’ It was the 1st Colorado Infantry.”

As soon as the forts were taken, the white flags appeared along the fortifications surrounding the city and the Americans entered and received the formal surrender of the city and the Spanish army defending it. These latter were disarmed and treated as prisoners of war. This was on the 13th day of August, 1898, three and one-half months after Manila Bay.

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### AGUINALDO'S FORCES HAD TO BE KEPT OUT OF MANILA

In these final operations Aguinaldo's army was requested to take no part, because Admiral Dewey and Generals Merritt and Greene, who commanded all our forces, believed that Aguinaldo's army could not be held in restraint if it ever got inside the city walls. In the unanimous judgment of all these commanders, Aguinaldo's army would do everything in its power to loot and sack the city. That we could not allow. To prevent it, General Greene, on the 12th of August, the night before the attack was to be made, notified Aguinaldo that the latter's army was not to take any hand at all in the next day's operations, nor in the occupation of Manila upon its capitulation.

Of this action of Dewey, Merritt and Greene, Mr. Abbott says, in his history:

"The sufficient justification for the restraint put upon the insurgents is the fact that, had they been admitted to the city before the American authority was complete and arrangements for the protection of life and property perfected, they would, beyond a shadow of a doubt, have sacked and looted the town." (Blue Jackets of '98, p. 344.)



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Mr. Lodge says of them (Hist. of the Spanish War):

"These natives wanted to kill and plunder . . . Behind them (the American troops) would come the insurgents with pillage, bloodshed and fire in their train.

"The American troops posted at the bridges and approaches to the city, holding back the insurgents, forbidding their entrance entirely, determined that there should be no pillage, no slaughter, no burning."

Now I want to call attention to an incident that throws another light on Aguinaldo's army and their code of morals. It is as follows, as taken from Mr. Lodge's book, p. 338:

"In spite of this request (that Aguinaldo would not join at all in the attack), when General Greene's advance guard reached the walls of Manila, they were followed by a considerable number of natives who, by their superior knowledge of the roads, rushed ahead of our troops and opened fire at once upon the 5000 or 6000 Spanish soldiers on the walls of the city, regardless of the fact that at that time the Spaniards had ceased firing and the white flag was flying from the fortifications. This unprovoked attack precipitated a renewal of the firing on our troops resulting in the death of one and the wounding of two of the 1st California Volunteers."

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Maj. Gen. Merritt's report of the capture of Manila contains the following:

"In leaving the subject of the operations . . . I submit that for troops to enter under fire a town covering a large area, to rapidly deploy and guard all principal points in the extensive suburbs, to keep out the insurgent forces pressing for admission, . . . and, finally, by all this, to prevent entirely all rapine, pillage, and disorder, and gain entire and complete possession of a city of 300,000 people, filled with natives hostile to the European interests, . . . was an act which only the law-abiding, temperate, resolute American soldier . . . could accomplish."

When it came to putting in writing the actual terms of the capitulation of Manila, the Spaniards wanted all sorts of things defined:—what they could and could not do and what we could and could not do; but we proposed to put in this sentence instead of all these qualifications, permissions and conditions:

"This city, its inhabitants, its churches and religious worship, its educational establishments and its private property of all descriptions are placed *under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.*"

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After thinking it all over, the Spaniards were quite content to leave the whole thing just that way, —“*under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army,*” and the Spaniards were perfectly safe in so doing. The American army never received a higher tribute from its best friends. This one came from its mortal enemy.

And when the day was done and he sat out on deck in his wicker chair, with his Scotch collie beside him, and, looking across the bay, saw for the first time the old Stars and Stripes waving softly to and fro in the evening breeze over the palace of the Spanish Governor-General, Dewey folded his hands and said to Brumby, “I feel that I have won a greater victory than that of May first.” And he had. In the years that are to come, Dewey’s greatest work, if I mistake not, the work that demanded the greatest and broadest qualities will be deemed not the Battle of Manila, but the course and measures by which, with only half a dozen unarmored ships, he, for three long months, kept Manila and the Spanish army and the insurgents and the hostile navies of Europe all working in harmony toward the accomplishment of his one purpose, namely, the actual occupation by the United

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States of the City of Manila, and the surrender of the Spanish army which garrisoned it. It was a fearful team to drive, but he kept them in the road until he got the load safely into the barn and the door shut.

## CHAPTER IV

### MR. McKINLEY'S PROBLEMS

#### INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY THE UNITED STATES

By a curious coincidence, for the second time in our history, a decisive blow was struck by us in a war after peace had actually been declared between our opponents and ourselves. The first was the battle of New Orleans, which took place January 8, 1815, although the treaty of peace (Ghent) was signed on the preceding December 24th; the second was the capitulation of the city of Manila and the Spanish army defending it. This took place twenty-four hours after the signing of the Protocol providing for the cessation of hostilities between Spain and ourselves. In neither case, of course, did either party know that the war had ended. Whether the Protocol of the 12th of August, the 3d condition of which provided that the United States should hold and occupy the

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city and bay of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which should determine "the control, disposition and government of the Philippines," superseded or only acted co-ordinately with the capitulation of the next day it is unnecessary to consider. Under either capitulation or Protocol, our obligations were the same toward everybody. Either way the question be decided, the fact remains that we were in "military occupation" of Manila. That is the important point, not how it was that we occupied Manila but that we did occupy it.

Then the situation sharply changed. The United States military and naval forces took possession. The moment that military occupation took place the United States assumed new liabilities. What they are has already been well defined. We went over the authorities sometime ago when we were considering why Dewey had to have help before he could accept the surrender of Manila and its garrison. These new liabilities were the same that Spain had before the surrender.

The obligations that would have attached to us on May 1, 1898, had Dewey then taken Manila and its garrison, are the same obligations that we actually did assume on the 13th of August, 1898.

## MR. MCKINLEY'S PROBLEMS

To sum up these authorities, they all mean that both by the capitulation of Manila on the 13th of August and by the Protocol of the 12th, we were charged by international law and by our own laws to "provide for the administration of justice" there from August 13, 1898, and, by the Hague 2nd Convention, we were bound to "take all steps in (our) power to re-establish and insure, so far as possible, public order and safety" in Manila, or, as Mr. Adams puts it, "by all the efforts in (our) power."

### PRESIDENT MCKINLEY'S COURSE INFLEXIBLY FIXED BY LAW

Mr. McKinley's hands were tied, and his course directed, by his oath of office, by the foregoing authorities. The following is sufficient to restate here:

Mr. Hannis Taylor, in § 579, says:

"Hostile territory subdued by the armies of the United States does not pass under the dominion either of its constitution or its laws. . . . While war continues it is the military duty of the President as Commander-in-chief, to provide for the security of persons and property, and for the administration of justice. (The Grape Shop, 9 Wall. 129.) Such government may be carried on under an entirely new code made by the authority of the Commander-in-chief." (Scott v. Bilgerry, 40 Miss. 119.)

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Now we have the problem right in front of us. If you had been President of the United States what would, what could you have done if you had had it to do? As President, you would have been charged with protecting the lives and property of every peaceable person in Manila. You would have done it if you could. That was what President McKinley did—nothing more. We were getting into strained relations with Aguinaldo's troops, some 20,000 or 30,000 of whom were just outside of our lines surrounding the city, clamoring to get in. Would you have withdrawn any of the troops that we had there with Aguinaldo's men watching for a chance to get by us? No. Nobody would suggest such a thing. We had to do everything in our power to maintain order. We should not have done that if we had withdrawn any of our troops, and so Mr. McKinley simply kept them there.

Soon up came the question of the basis upon which we should settle the war. Almost exactly a third of the entire Spanish Empire, both in extent and in people, was comprised in the Philippines, and I am informed and I believe that Mr. McKinley considered the situation in this way, viz.: "According to the best information now at our disposi-



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tion, it would appear that the Filipinos are probably not now capable of self-government. Fortunately or not for us, we are the controlling factor in the Philippines. If the inhabitants cannot govern themselves and we withdraw, the chances are that there will be a reign of terror—chaos. That will continue unless stopped by the seizure of the islands by some other nation. If that other nation does step in, it is likely to enslave, practically, the Filipinos and forever condemn them to the same sort of tyranny, misrule, plunder and ignorance as that which they have suffered for three centuries under Spain. A monarchy usually maintains colonies only for what it can get out of them—for what it can milk them.

“If we are to gauge the future fate of the prospective Filipino colonist by his experience under Spain, the difference between chaos and a colony is not very great.

“There seems to be no course but one of these, chaos or colony, that is open to the Filipino (unless he can govern himself), if we fail to take hold of him. If we stay where we are, there will be no chaos—there will be no colony on the usual European basis of plunder, poverty, ignorance and

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overtaxation. If the Filipino can now govern himself, we'll withdraw immediately. If he cannot, we'll try to lead him along till he can. He'll be safe as long as we stay, and he may be unsafe if we evacuate just now. Then we will stay until we find out more about him. In case it develops that he cannot now govern himself he will never be willfully mistreated by us.

“Instead of designedly and deliberately regulating our conduct with the Filipino, in case he cannot govern himself, so as to keep him helpless, ignorant, poor and, therefore, always under our heel, we are the only people on this globe, or who have ever been on it, unless we except the English, who will try to make the Filipinos stronger, better educated, better civilized—FREE. The policy of the American people, if it takes hold of the Filipino, will be to make him a free man just as soon as he can walk alone. If our history means anything, it means that. All history does not record an instance in which a nation has deliberately gone about building up one of its neighbors for the sole purpose of making the latter stronger and better—for the sole purpose of making the latter free and independent. But we shall do it in Cuba. We shall do it in Porto

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Rico, and the American people can be trusted to do it in the Philippines"—and William McKinley instructed the Commissioners of the United States, who were to try to negotiate a treaty of peace with Spain, that they demand that the Philippines should come to us, and on December 10, 1898, the treaty that brought about that object was signed in Paris. Of course, that would not go into effect until ratified by each government and copies exchanged, but the whole world felt that it was probably only a question of a few weeks at the most when we should have the legal possession of the islands. As a matter of fact, the treaty took effect on April 12, 1899, some four months after its signing."

### MR. MCKINLEY'S EFFORTS TO FIND OUT THE FACTS

As soon as the Treaty was signed, Mr. McKinley set about a systematic attempt to obtain information upon which we would decide whether or not we were to turn the Philippines over to their inhabitants to govern, or whether we would have to stay there to help them for a time. Mr. McKinley couldn't go himself, so he did what would seem to be the next best thing; and that was to send a committee over there of the ablest men he could pick out to report

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to him on these matters. Until they had reported Mr. McKinley evidently intended to do nothing—absolutely nothing—except to preserve order. In that course of inaction, he, of course, showed sound judgment. Only a man of little experience in large affairs has a policy before he knows all about the problem. Mr. McKinley was not that sort of a man. Fourteen years in Congress, a number of which were spent at the head of the Ways and Means Committee that says how we shall raise our revenue and how much it shall be, a matter of \$500,000,000 or so every year, had made him very careful.

### QUALIFICATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF MR. MCKINLEY'S FIRST COMMISSION

Let us look at the men he selected to do this exceedingly important work. As Chairman, he selected Hon. Jacob G. Schurman, President of Cornell University, a Republican, a man then forty-six years of age, born in Prince Edward Island; educated by two years at Acadia College, three years in the University of London, two years divided between the Universities of Berlin, Heidelberg, Göttingen and independent study in Italy. On his return to America he was Professor of English

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Literature and Political Economy at Acadia College; then for two years he was professor in the same studies in Dalhousie College, Halifax; from there he went to Cornell to become the head of the Department of Philosophy, and was shortly afterward made President of that University, which position he has held ever since. He is a deep student of philosophical subjects and has published three or four works in that field.

Next was George Dewey, then sixty-two years of age, a Vermonter, root and branch. As he was born on the Hog River, I can see the only justification the Spanish ever had for calling him an "American pig." Dewey is a college man, a graduate of Norwich University and an Annapolis man, too. He was a midshipman in 1854, a Lieutenant in '61, a Commander in 1872, a Commodore in 1896, a Rear Admiral, May 13, 1898, and soon to be Admiral—all this time without a single black mark against him. He had been for nearly a year in and about Manila and, therefore, knew the details of the questions that would be raised better than anybody else we could obtain. He was a Democrat.

Hon. Charles Denby, a Democrat, of Indiana, was

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the next selection; a man then sixty-nine years of age, a Virginia boy, who had lived in France thirteen years before he was seventeen, a college man and a college professor, a newspaper editor, a lawyer of highest standing, a legislator, a Colonel in the Rebellion, Minister to China for thirteen years, remaining undisturbed when the Republicans came into power during that period, so high was his standing; the ablest diplomat, except John Hay, in our service and so recognized generally.

Prof. Dean C. Worcester, another Vermonter, a graduate of Ann Arbor, assistant-professor of Zoology in that college and a man who had recently spent several years in the Philippines on two different expeditions, making collections for his work, during which trips he had thoroughly explored much of the islands and obtained wide acquaintance with their geography, their peoples and their customs. He was the encyclopedia of the committee.

The final member was Maj.-Gen. Otis, U. S. A., a Maryland boy, born in 1838 and, therefore, sixty-one years of age at this time; a graduate of the University of Rochester and of the Harvard Law School; a Captain and Brevet Brigadier-gen-

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eral in the Rebellion. A wound that has never healed compelled him to abandon the law and remain in the army, where he could be out-of-doors, and from a Lieutenant-colonel in the regular army in 1866 he rose to be a Colonel in 1880, a Brigadier in 1893 and a Major-general in 1898. From the '60's to the '90's he was in about all the Indian troubles we had, and always honorably and with distinction. At the time of his appointment to this committee, or commission, he had for four or five months been in command of all our forces in Manila.

I fail to see how the President could have chosen a stronger committee. They were all of great and varied experience, learning and travel and had had to study different peoples—a college president, the Admiral to-be of the United States Navy, the best trained diplomat we had, except John Hay, one of the three major-generals of the army and a college professor, all but one of whom were on the ground or perfectly familiar with it. Can anyone suggest a weak place in it? I don't believe any of us could have improved upon it as a whole.

If we had sent them out there to report to us on what they found, we would have relied upon their

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representations, wouldn't we: else, why should we have sent them?

### SUBSTANCE OF THEIR REPORT TO MR. MCKINLEY

Now let us see what they reported to the President, as their unanimous judgment—Democrats and Republicans, soldier, sailor, diplomat, college professor. While they were on their way to the Philippines our troops were attacked by Aguinaldo's men, and, when the Commission reached Manila, we were engaged in a war with the army gathered by him.

Here is an extract from the report of the Commission:

"Their (the Filipinos') lack of education and political experience, combined with their racial and linguistic diversities, disqualify them, in spite of their mental gifts and domestic virtues, to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time. . . Should our power, by any fatality, be withdrawn, the commission believes that the government of the Philippines would speedily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not necessitate, the intervention of other powers, and the eventual division of the islands among them. Only through American occupation, therefore, is the idea of a free, self-governing and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable."

The Commission simply confirmed the view that the President had feared to be the truth when he de-



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manded the cession of the islands. So our remaining there as long as we had was justified and it became apparent that Mr. McKinley had proceeded safely, mercifully and wisely when he decided to stay until he knew whether or not the Filipino could govern himself.

Now, what could we do in the face of that report? That was the exact question confronting Mr. McKinley. He had to meet it squarely and do something with it. He couldn't dodge it. He couldn't postpone it. He had to decide, now, finally. All the facts were now before him. There was no longer ignorance to justify inaction.

Let us dissect this report and see what the President's problem's were:

1. The commission said the Filipinos were unable to undertake the task of governing the archipelago at the present time.

2. The commission said that if the United States were to withdraw, the islands would lapse into anarchy and that would mean that the great powers would step in to protect their citizens and property there and would divide the islands among themselves.

3. The commission said, by implication, which

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

was, of course, true, that if the European powers did divide or take the islands there was no hope that the Philippines could ever be independent. Europe isn't in the business of setting up republics. Europe would only take these islands to squeeze, to milk, to bleed them just as Spain had done for the 300 years just passed.

It came up sharply to Mr. McKinley,—“If we desert them, they will lapse into anarchy and then go to the Great Powers to be forever, practically, slaves. If we take them, they will be free as soon as they can walk alone.” In the former case they had no chance of ever being free. In the latter they had—and I believe this is the exact reason that made Mr. McKinley advocate the cession of the islands to us by the Treaty of Peace. Such a reason would be entirely in accord with his character, almost any other reason is inconsistent therewith, and if we ever had a President who would take such a stand William McKinley was that man!

MR. MCKINLEY DECIDES ON THEIR REPORT AS A BASIS

Mr. McKinley had, I say, to decide; and I doubt if it took him very long. No person needing help ever appealed to William McKinley in vain. Mr.

## MR. McKINLEY'S PROBLEMS

McKinley decided that it was our duty not to desert the Filipinos—that, as he said, “There must be no scuttle policy”—and that the American people would back him up; and, as always, his mind once made up, he could not be swerved; and he poured our troops over there to establish order and to maintain it. Then Aguinaldo found out that his dream of revenge on the Spaniards and of making his tribe the ruler of the rest of the races was going to vanish in smoke. Then the great mass of the Filipino people, who were peaceful, found that the United States Army would protect them against the terrible cruelties that Aguinaldo’s bands inflicted with great frequency upon those who would not join him.

A fair and the most reasonable statement of what Aguinaldo was doing seems to be to say that his efforts probably were directed at securing the control of all the tribes in the Philippines for his own race. No other explanation of his frightful butchery of the peaceful, great mass of the people appears to be consistent with any other motive. If freedom for the Filipinos was his object, then for the first time in the world’s history, if I read it aright, has a deliverer deemed it necessary to kill those for whom he was laboring.

## CHAPTER V

### THE BLOW FROM BEHIND STRIKES

#### THE BLOW FROM BEHIND FALLS ON OUR SOLDIERS

JUST as we were in the hottest of our campaign against Aguinaldo which we were waging to protect the great mass of the Filipinos and to meet our obligations which we had assumed toward other nations, there struck our army over there, what the Hon. John Barrett, late our Minister to Siam, called "The blow from behind."

As if out of the ground, there arose in this country a set of people calling themselves anti-imperialists. They were first seen in Boston. These people said that if it were not for them, this republic would become an empire; and they had come to prevent that. They said that if we kept on trying to save the Filipinos from Aguinaldo and anarchy, this republic would pass from the earth and an empire would rise in its stead. They took to print, and they flooded the mails with pamphlets called "The

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND STRIKES

Anti-Imperialist." The cover states that these pamphlets are "published at intervals." I fail to recognize the place, but, after studying what lies between the covers, I am glad that I am unable to find the place on the map; if I could, I should be forever avoiding it.

These publications attracted great attention. They were quoted by all the papers and people who are usually "anti" everything that the most of the world believes in, as if the statistics and statements in them were the law and the prophets. These pamphlets present a truly terrific array of figures that would sicken the stoutest heart of our work in the Philippines. The high priest of this "Anti-Imperialist" is Edward Atkinson of Boston, a gentleman, who, I believe, has secured the printing of more statistics with respect to matters that had nothing to do with his own vocation, which is, I am informed, that of fire insurance, than probably anybody else in the universe.

These figures presented by Mr. Atkinson in these books have, I believe, not heretofore been examined with a microscope, but it is purposed to turn one right on to them here, for it is desired to place the anti-imperialists, so far as I may be able to do it,

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in their proper and exact place before the country. I cannot hope to do much; but I believe I can do something. Let us see what sort of statements were the backbone and foundation of this anti-imperialist movement. Let us see what they were worth. What was its real, actual basis? Was it a solid one? I undertake to say that it was a foundation of sand, that there was not a single sound timber in its supports and that the whole case was founded upon misrepresentation, libel, deceit and falsehood.

These are strong accusations; but the facts are here. In the first place, let us consider Mr. Atkinson's statements of the cost of this war in the Philippines. His pamphlets were devoted almost exclusively to proving two things; first, that the money cost of the war would lead to an enormous deficit in our treasury, and second, that the loss in lives and the suffering of our soldiers would be awful.

What I propose to do is to parallel column his prophecies with the facts.

## CHAPTER VI

### ATKINSON'S RIDICULOUS FINANCE

EDWARD ATKINSON'S FINANCIAL PROPHECIES PROVEN  
RIDICULOUS AND FULL OF MISSTATEMENTS

HERE is Mr. Atkinson's record in his own books, and he and we must stand by the results here shown. Here is Vol. I of the "Anti-Imperialist." On p. 8 is this heading in large type.

PROSPECTIVE DEFICIT  
IN THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1900, \$150,-  
000,000, *probably more.*

BY EDWARD ATKINSON.

Now what is the fact? What was the deficit "IN THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1900?" "A DEFICIT OF \$150,000,000, *probably more*" he puts it, in italics.

Now let us go to the fountain head on this matter. Here is the annual report of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Lyman J. Gage, on the state of the

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finances for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1900. On page vii we find this:

“Treasury Department,  
Washington, Dec. 4, 1900.

“Sir: (To the Speaker of the House of Representatives) I have the honor to submit the following report.

“Receipts and Expenditures.  
Fiscal Year, 1900.

“The revenues of the government from all sources for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1900, were: Total receipts, \$567,000,000, total expenditures \$488,000,000, showing a surplus of \$79,000,000.”

(Postal service items are left out of Mr. Atkinson's calculations and, therefore out of all calculations herein, as well. Also all amounts, as a rule, are made into even millions by dropping all except the millions of the exact figures.) Mr. Atkinson says in large type and italics, “PROSPECTIVE DEFICIT IN THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1900: —\$150,000,000,—*probably more.*” That is, Mr. Atkinson was \$229,000,000 out of the way! He said a deficit of \$150,000,000; we had a surplus of \$79,000,000 and he was the sum of those two from the correct figures,—\$229,000,000,—nearly half of all our expenditures for the whole year, which were



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only \$488,000,000; if he had been \$15,000,000 more wrong he would have made an error exactly equal to one half our total expenditures for the year;—one half of all our expenditures being \$244,000,000; and he was wrong \$229,000,000!

Now let us take his next statement; "In respect to revenue, if the sovereignty of the United States is extended over the Philippine Islands, Porto Rico and Cuba, the expected customs revenue computed by the Secretary of the Treasury at \$205,000,000 will be diminished by about \$75,000,000; for reasons which will be subsequently given." (That is, they will be only \$130,000,000.)

Now what is the fact? He says that they will be \$130,000,000 only. The 1900 report of the secretary of the treasury, p. vii., 2d item, says "received from customs, \$233,000,000." Mr. Atkinson said \$130,000,000; we received \$233,000,000; on this single item, then, Mr. Atkinson is wrong \$103,000,000.

In the very next paragraph of this pamphlet, Mr. Atkinson says:

"The army and navy estimates appear to be very inadequate. For reasons hereafter given it is probable that the expenditures must be increased to about eight dollars per head, or from \$540,000,000 to \$624,000,000."

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Now let us examine that statement. In the first place he says "the army and navy estimates appear to be very inadequate." Now let us see about that. What were the army and navy estimates. Here they are, army, \$190,000,000; navy, \$47,000,000. Mr. Gage says in his report that the actual figure of expenditures for that year were, army, \$134,000,000, (Mr. Gage's estimate was \$190,000,000) and navy, \$55,000,000 (and his estimate was \$47,000,000); that is, the estimates of the secretary called for a total of \$237,000,000,—his expenses were \$189,000,000 (or \$48,000,000 less than he had requested be placed at his disposition by Congress) and Mr. Atkinson calls these estimates "very inadequate" when they were really \$48,000,000 more than was needed.

In the statement just made, Mr. Atkinson says it is probable that the expenditures will be \$624,000,000. Now what is the fact? How near does he come this time? Take up the report of the secretary of the treasury and what do we find, bottom of p. vii? "Total expenditures, \$488,000,000,"—that is, Mr. Atkinson was \$136,000,000 out of the way. In the succeeding sentence (p. 9 of the pamphlet) Mr. Atkinson says, "The probable de-

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iciency of the year would come up to \$190,000,000." That would shake the country to its foundation.

What was the fact? As said a moment ago, Mr. Gage reports a surplus of \$79,000,000 for that year, *so that Mr. Atkinson was \$269,000,000 out of the way of the truth. That variation of \$269,000,000 is over 55 per cent. of all the expenditures of the United States government for the fiscal year of 1900.*

In the next sentence, Mr. Atkinson says:

"A deduction may, perhaps be made from this sum in view of the fact that the number of volunteer troops on which the computations of the secretary of war are based exceeds the number called for by the officers of the army itself. We may therefore possibly reduce the probable deficit to a minimum of \$150,000,000."

That is, the lowest minimum he mentions is \$150,000,000. All right. Even at that, as we had a surplus of \$79,000,000 he is \$229,000,000 out of the way,—but, as we have just found, he says that probably the deficit will be \$190,000,000, at the lowest minimum \$150,000,000; so that, giving him all we can by adopting the construction of his statements which is the more favorable to him, he is still \$229,000,000 to the bad,—enough to enable us to safely conclude that we are very polite and

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

considerate to him when we refrain from saying anything worse of him than that his computations are unworthy of serious consideration.

But let us go on. On p. 10, he says:

“In the matter of revenue, Secretary Gage holds out the expectation to secure \$205,000,000 from duties on sugar, tobacco, cigars, rice and tropical fruits. The decisions of the courts are, however, continuous and final to the effect that whenever the jurisdiction of the United States is extended over an area of territory, the inhabitants thereof become entitled to move without let or hindrance throughout the country, and subject to the same laws for the collection of revenues as have been previously in force in the United States. It, therefore, follows that, if the sovereignty of the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico is assumed, their sugar and other products, like those of Hawaii are entitled to free entry. . . The loss of revenue, under these conditions, would be approximately \$75,000,000.”

Here is where he is willing to act as secretary of the treasury and as the Supreme Court of the United States,—a task that does not seem too burdensome for him. “The decisions of the courts are continuous and final to the effect,” he says, that we should lose \$75,000,000 in the fiscal year of 1900 from the \$205,000,000 the secretary of the treasury said we should receive. You will notice that Mr. Atkinson is perfectly confident about what the law

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has been, is and will be. "The decisions of the courts are," he says, so and so and "it, therefore, follows" so and so. There are no reservations.

Now, what is the fact? I do not need to tell you. The decisions of the courts which he says were "continuous and final" to the effect that we should lose \$75,000,000 from customs because we could not keep tariff on sugar, tobacco, cigars, etc., etc., that came in from the Philippines and our other island possessions, were not "continuous and final," to the effect stated by him.

The United States Supreme Court has decided this much anyway beyond peradventure, namely, that Mr. Edward Atkinson was wrong, when he said that; and we have been collecting our customs on all these commodities all the while he said we could not, while we said "perhaps we can't, but we shall;" and for the year ending June 30, 1900, when our secretary of the treasury said we should collect from customs \$205,000,000—and Mr. Edward Atkinson said we should take in only \$130,000,000—we actually did take in from this source (p. vii., Secretary Gage's report, 1900; 2d item, top of page) \$233,000,000; or \$103,000,000 more than Mr. Atkinson tried to make us fear we would secure, only.

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On p. 10 (idem) Mr. Atkinson says:

"The only conclusions which can be derived from these official data are, therefore, as follows:

"Deficit computed by secretary of treasury for fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, \$30,000,000.

"Add for the necessary increase in the army, navy and pension estimates to cover the expense of military occupation, armaments, fortifications, renewal of forces, increase of pensions and for other matters of positive necessity under such conditions, say, \$85,000,000. Total deficit on secretary's computed revenue, \$115,000,000.

"Add prospective loss of revenue from sugar, tobacco, cigars, rice and tropical fruits, unless some way can be found for evading what are apparently the decisions of the courts in this matter, \$75,000,000. Probable deficit, \$190,000,000."

Now let us look at his second item in this table. "Add for the necessary increase in the army, navy, and pension estimates to cover the expense of military occupation, armaments, fortifications, renewal of forces, increase of pensions and for other matters of positive necessity under such conditions, say, \$85,000,000." Now the facts are that Mr. Gage estimated \$237,000,000 for the war and navy departments combined and \$145,000,000 for pensions, or \$382,000,000 in all. Mr. Atkinson says that there should be \$85,000,000 added to these, that is that

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they should be \$467,000,000. Mr. Gage reports (p. vii., 1900 report) that he actually expended for these three items, \$329,000,000. Mr. Atkinson's estimate is \$467,000,000, that is, \$138,000,000 too much.

“ Probable deficit \$190,000,000 ” and on the next page he repeats the statement. This is his third statement to this effect in the course of three pages, and we must take it as his best judgment, for he repeats it more than any other one figure; and, as we had a surplus of \$79,000,000 instead of his deficit of \$190,000,000, he was, as said before, \$269,000,000 out of the way; that is, his error is equivalent to more than 55 per cent. of our total expenditure for the year, which was \$488,000,000!

Is this people to trust such a man as that? Is he entitled to our support? Is he to be taken even seriously after having deliberately put out such statements as these? A man who knew nothing at all about the finance of the country could hardly have done worse, and yet I have called your attention to only half a dozen statements. There are many more which my limited space forbids mentioning; these I have shown are only typical—I have omitted far more than I have mentioned.

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He expected to frighten the people by these statements,—these wild, fantastic traductions which he calls deductions. Let us see what he says on the top of p. 12, after he has set out all these figures we have been going over :

“ It will be apparent to every business man that the present favorable aspect of affairs in almost every line of work must be changed as soon as it becomes evident that from and after May 1, 1899, or thereabout, the reserve of the treasury will be drawn upon at the rate of \$10,000,000 to \$15,000,000 per month continuously in order to meet the deficit disclosed by these facts. Unless there is an extra session of Congress there could be no remedial legislation in less than about one year. In that year the whole business of the country will be placed in uncertainty by the depletion of the reserve of the treasury in the absence of any sound banking legislation at the present session of Congress.”

It is unnecessary to say, as the treasury has always run far ahead of its expenditures ever since that statement was made, that the statement last quoted had no foundation in fact.

But there are more serious things in these pamphlets than overestimates. He has, on his own record, either resorted to trickery, so desperate was he made when the cold, actual receipts and expenditures showed the utter folly and foolishness of his



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statements, or else, to be charitable, he has been guilty of the grossest and almost indefensible carelessness in presenting a very serious matter.

When the real results of the fiscal year of 1900 had placed him where he could no longer be considered as a reasonable man in future figuring concerning national finance, a year later he essayed to act as a historian of the subject. And right here, he commits a most serious offense. If it is not an error, he is resorting to tactics that are unknown to gentlemen. If it is an honest error, it is most remarkable, for the same mistake occurs twice.

On p. 11, No. 6 of the Anti-Imperialist, the final number, he prepares tables purporting to represent the per capita receipts and expenditures during the first administration of President McKinley. In introducing these tables, he says (bottom p. 10, No. 6.)

"The subsequent analysis gives the actual disbursements for three years of the McKinley administration, with the estimates of the secretary of the treasury, and the appropriation made by Congress for the present fiscal year."

In the first table on p. 11, he has a column headed

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“revenue (1901 on estimate of secretary of treasury)” and another “net expenditures after deducting postal receipts.” In the first column, Mr. Atkinson deliberately states that the figure given for the 1901 revenue is the estimate of the secretary of the treasury, and then proceeds to state that figure as \$560,000,000. I have here Mr. Gage’s report for 1900 and on p. 11, of that report, he estimates that the revenues of the government for the year 1901 will be \$580,000,000,—or \$20,000,000 more than what Mr. Atkinson says the secretary said; so that here is a deliberate misstatement or inexcusable error by Mr. Atkinson.

In the second column (p. 11, Anti-Imperialist, No. 6) he states that the secretary of the treasury estimates the expenditures after deducting postal expenditures for 1901 to be \$605,000,000,—as a matter of fact, the secretary’s estimate was \$500,000,000; the explanation is that Mr. Atkinson did not take out \$107,000,000 of postal expenditures from Mr. Gage’s estimate when Mr. Atkinson said he did. Mr. Gage’s figures are as follows: (Sec. Rep. 1900, p. 11.)

“Fiscal year 1901. The revenues of the government for the fiscal year are thus estimated upon the

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basis of existing laws; total estimated revenues, (Postal receipts deducted), \$580,000,000; total estimated expenditures, (Postal expenditures deducted); \$500,000,000."

That is to say, if the postal expenditures of \$107,000,000 be added, Mr. Gage reports a total estimated expenditure of \$607,000,000 with the postal expenditure *in*. Mr. Atkinson's statement is that the secretary said \$607,000,000 (\$605,000,000 exactly), with the postal expenditures *out*.

The same mistake, if we shall continue to so call it, is repeated in another table on the same page; and on top of the next page (*idem*), Mr. Atkinson says something I would rather not describe as I believe it to be. I am unable to apply such soft words as mistake, error, or misapprehension in this instance, when, on the top of p. 12, No. 6, Mr. Atkinson says:

"In his recommendation contained in his annual report, the secretary of the treasury presented estimates for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, of \$578,081,994.86, expressing the hope that Congress would reduce the amounts asked by the several departments so as to avoid an expected deficit of \$18,000,000."

I have read the secretary's report from cover to

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cover, several times, in a search for such a statement by him, but I am entirely unable to discover it. *The Secretary has made no such statement or anything like it in his report.* On the contrary, the report of the secretary of the treasury for the fiscal year, 1900, on p. 11, says: "Fiscal year 1901—The revenues of the government for the current fiscal year are thus estimated upon the basis of existing laws: Total estimated revenues, \$580,000,000; total estimated expenditures, \$500,000,000, or a surplus of \$80,000,000."

Mr. Atkinson, in the face of this, says that the secretary says in his report that he expects a deficit of \$18,000,000 and he carefully repeats this statement on p. 14,—when, as a matter of fact, what the secretary does say is "a surplus of \$80,000,000,"—an error by Mr. Atkinson of \$98,000,000.

I think these figures effectually dispose of the Edward Atkinson of these days as a statistician. I shall never trust another figure of his until it is proven. I had expected to find him, at least, a gentleman. Indeed, I am almost ready to join the sentiment said to have been expressed by a certain elderly gentleman in a somewhat famous reply which he is credited with having made to Mr. At-

## ATKINSON'S RIDICULOUS FINANCE

kinson. The elderly party was going home on his usual evening train, and was deep in the delights of his newspaper when Mr. Atkinson brushed in and, all aglow with enthusiasm, said, as he offered his hand a little effusively to the man behind the paper, "Ah, good evening, Mr. B——, I'm delighted to see you, delighted. Have you seen my last pamphlet?" Evidently the interruption was not the most welcome thing in the world at just that place in the daily love story, for, as he took his visitor's hand, the old gentleman said, forcibly and with much emphasis, "Good God, I hope so!" I have never heard of what was said after that.

## CHAPTER VII

### ATKINSON'S GHASTLY DEATH STATISTICS

#### DISEASES IN OUR ARMY IN THE PHILIPPINES

It would not be surprising if a man who will spend days in tabulating such financial statements as we have just examined could, if he cannot carry his point in any other way, see nothing wrong in frightening every mother in the country who had a boy out there in the Philippines. For each of those boys we sent out there was somebody's boy,—the pride of some gray-haired woman whose sight was growing dim with the years and the tears while she waited and watched for him to come back. Remember that,—that each soldier is somebody's boy, and remember it while we are considering what is to follow.

I desire to show you the picture Mr. Atkinson painted and thrust up into the faces of those in the homes of these boys who went to the Philippines.

## ATKINSON'S GHASTLY DEATH STATISTICS

We who remember those saints we called "Mother," and can now see them in no other way, can realize what an awful thing such statements as these would have been to her if her boy had been going out there. We know that such a picture as Mr. Atkinson paints here would never leave your mother or mine, night or day, till her boy came back,—not for an instant would that picture leave her,—it would lurk in the depths of every cup and sicken her as it leered out of every mirror.

On p. 9, of the *Anti-Imperialist*, No. 2, Mr. Atkinson says:

"There is no estimate of the necessary expense of raising every year a new force equal to about one-third of the entire force required in order to fill the annual gaps which will be caused by death and disease (by service in the Philippines). By a comparison of all the data, it becomes apparent that about one-third of the white troops stationed in tropical climates must be replaced year by year by fresh levies to make up for death or disability."

On p. 10 of the same pamphlet, he says further:

"There is no sign or hint of any pension being granted to the survivors of the Spanish war or for the support of the twenty per cent. at least, of all the troops sent out each year to the tropics who will be brought back wholly or partly disabled."

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On p. 22, same book:

"Only a part of the horrors of military control in tropical climates have been yet exposed. . . In 1895 France took possession of Madagascar. . . The following extracts from an official report will surely indicate the probable results of our present campaign in the Philippine Islands, which are much nearer the equator, and where our forces must, of necessity, be confined to the most dangerous section of the malarious and pestilential coast stations. . . . Amongst the military troops the general mortality was 356 per 1000. . . The body which was the most severely afflicted was that of the military engineers which worked on the construction of the roads and bridges; two-thirds of them died. Then comes with a proportion of 623 per 1000, the 40th battalion of 'chasseurs à pied,' which was worn out by its forced march on Tsarasota, and of which not one man reached Tananarive. . . It was not a question of sickness, but of death; the general average of deaths for the military troops reached nearly 40 per 100, while in some bodies of troops it was over 60 per 100."

Now let us go to Anti-Imperialist No. 4 on p. 5:

"It appears that the executive officers of the government . . . are now afraid to have the ghastly facts of the conditions in Manila become known to the public at home, lest men should be prevented from enlisting; or, what is practically the true term, be warned against committing gradual suicide by military service in the tropics."



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Now let us look at No. 6, p. 15:

"The weakened and disabled volunteers and regulars returned from Manila will be scattered about the country or in hospitals recovering from the ghastly conditions of two years' service in the malarial swamps of the Philippines, many thousand of the original number having been killed in battle or having died from disease."

Now I want to go back to No. 2, p. 23:

"By the rule of proportion, without making any allowance for the hotter and more pestilential conditions of the Philippine Islands, the death-rate in our forces in the Philippines will be one-third; probably a greater number will be sent home invalided, . . . (that is, two-thirds dead and sent home). Many self-sacrificing men might enlist on the certainty of death or disability within two years, but will, of course, be married before leaving for Manila, in order to be assured of adequate pensions for their widows and children."

On p. 44, same number, are these statements that cap them all:

"Will not the mothers of the land regret the loss of their sons, now on the way to or now in Manila, only beginning to be exposed to worse dangers than resistance of the Filipinos under the ghastly conditions of the worst of tropical climates in the rainy season? In an aggressive campaign away from the sea we may fear that of the 25,000 men who have

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been dispatched to Manila, if kept there three or four months longer, not one-half will ever see their native land again; we may fear that nearly all of the other half who may return will come back impaired in health and strength. The evidence of these dangers is conclusive. The facts disclosed by the records of the British, French and Dutch armies almost prove that such will be the fate we are bringing upon the children of Americans. . . .

"If the regular army of the United States is stationed in the Philippine Islands . . . and kept there six months, it is practically certain that after that term has elapsed there will be no regular army of the United States in existence, capable of any effectual service even on the part of the survivors."

Now there is the picture! Again I say, what a picture for an American man to thrust up into the faces of the mothers of the 100,000 boys we sent out there!

First let us look at the 1899 report of the surgeon general of the army, p. 237:

"The admission and death rates in the Philippines,—2,070.62 and 22.74, respectively, did not differ much from those in the United States, 2,043.01 and 20.14."

That is, of every 1000 men in the United States army who remained in this country in the year 1898, there were 2043 admissions to the sick report, or

## ATKINSON'S GHASTLY DEATH STATISTICS

to put it another way,—every man was entered on the sick report about twice a year. In the Philippines for the same time, of every 1000 men there were 2070 admissions, or just 27 more sick in the Philippines than in the United States for the same time.

And as to the deaths. In 1898, there were 20 men who died in every 1000 in the army in this country and 22 men in every 1000 in the Philippines,—that is, 2 per cent. per 1000 of our men who stayed in the United States died in '98 and 2.2 per cent of our men in the Philippines, (*Ibid.*, p. 237)—the total deaths from all causes in the Philippines, numbering 239 souls. Where are the horrors and the ghastly facts about which Mr. Atkinson was declaiming? In 1898 service in the army was just as dangerous in the United States as it was in the Philippines,—these facts show that.

Now let us look at the 1900 report of the Surgeon General, at p. 350:

The mean strength of the army in the Philippines was for the year 1899, 39,280.

“Deaths from all causes for the year, 1201.”

“Deaths from all causes for each 1000 men, 30.58.”

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That is, in the year from January 1, 1899, we lost in the Philippines 3.5 per cent. of our men per 1000 by death for all causes. How this magnificent record must sadden Mr. Atkinson! He said, you will recall that "not one-half" of all the soldiers we sent over to the Philippines "will ever see their native land again!" How does this compare with a death rate of  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. per 1000? He is only 47 per cent. out of the way.

Now let us look at the 1901 report of the Surgeon General and see how things stood from January 1, 1900, to January 1, 1901: (p. 318.)

"Average number of men in Philippines, 66,882."

"Total deaths from all causes, 1923, or 2.8 per cent. of each 1000 men."

On p. 130 is the report of the Chief Surgeon of the Division of the Philippines,

"REPORT OF . . . CHIEF SURGEON OF THE PHILIPPINES.

"Manila, P. I., May 31, 1901.

"I have the honor, prior to my departure for the United States, to submit a report of the operations of the medical department in the Division of the Philippines for the period ending May 31, 1901:

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### "HEALTH OF ARMY.

"The health of the troops continues to be good, and the ratio of non-effectives to the whole strength has still further diminished. The average for the 7 months covered by my last report was 8.84 per cent.; for nine months ending March 31, the average is 7.52 per cent.": (an average of 8.18 per cent. for 16 months).

An average of 8.18 per cent., only, not able to respond to roll call,—8 men, only, out of each 100 all through the army in the Philippines during the 16 months between Nov. 30, 1899, and April 1, 1901, with 66,000 men in the field! While a still later report, p. 128, states:

"From the close of the calendar year 1900 to the latest reports the health of the troops in the Philippines has been steadily improving. The Chief Surgeon has reported a progressive diminution in the non-efficiency of the command from disease and injury. In July and August, 1900, the non-efficiency constituted 9.47 and, 9.58 per cent. of the strength. From January to June, 1901, the non-efficiency was less than 7 per cent., the lowest rate 6.12 per cent. having been recorded in March."

That shows the conditions up to June 1, 1901—less than 7 per cent. of the men too ill to report for duty from any cause whatever!

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On May 8, 1902, the Assistant-Surgeon General, U. S. A., forwarded to me a letter in which he says:

"The latest information from the Chief Surgeon of the division of the Philippines is to the effect that during the month ending March 15, 1902, there were 6.45 per cent. of the command on sick report for disease and injury"—and in the advance sheets of the 1902 Report of the Secretary of War, the following appears, pp. 5-6:

"The health of the army has shown continued improvement. . . This large reduction of death roll was in a great measure due to improved conditions in the Philippines, where the rate was reduced to 17.96 per thousand in the year 1901, as against 29.42 per thousand in the year 1900.\*

. . . The rates of admission to sick report for disease and injury and the rate of discharge for disability during the calendar year 1901 agree with the reduced mortality rate in being considerably less than the corresponding rates for the year 1900.

"A further improvement of health in the Philippines may be anticipated from the cessation of guerrilla warfare with the exposure incident to it, and from the concentration of the troops remaining in the islands in a smaller number of posts selected and constructed with special reference to sanitary conditions."

Now just to drive the nail home hard, I want to repeat one of Mr. Atkinson's statements. He says,

\* The Secretary's figure for 1900 is, obviously, an error—28.75 is the figure given for 1900 in the 1901 report.

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you will recall, "if the regular army of the United States is stationed in the Philippine islands and kept there six months, it is practically certain that, after that time has elapsed, there will be no regular army of the United States in existence capable of any effectual service even on the part of the survivors." Over three and one-half years have gone by since he said that during all of which time we have had some 60,000 troops there, until the fall of 1901, when we commenced to bring them back, so that they were there not only his six months but four times that. His statement means, if anything, that our army would be wiped out entirely.

The 1902 Report of the Surgeon General, p. 149, shows that, in 1901, we lost 1069 men in the Philippines and China. This last report enables us to give the record of the entire four years of the Philippine war, as it officially ended July 4, 1902, when military rule was abandoned and superseded by that of the civil arm.

The death rate in the army in the Philippines in '98 was 22.74, 30.58 in '99, 28.75 in 1900 and 17.96 in 1891—an average of 25, and a total of 4432 lives, an average of 1108 for the entire four years.

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Now what does a death rate of 25 mean? Let us look at that a moment. A hasty glance at some representative cities of our own country will be of service. In Burlington, Vt., in 1900 the death rate was 18 per 1000. That is only seven less per thousand than we lost from all causes in the Philippine army, in a tropical climate, for over four years, more than 8000 miles from home and in a war with Filipinos and Anti-Imperialists!

The death rate in the year 1900 in Augusta, Me., was over 26, one more than our Philippine rate of 25, while the rate throughout the southern part of our own country appears to average much higher than the rate in our army in the Philippines; for example, here are some 1900 rates (1900 United States Census). New Orleans, 28; Natchez, 39; Raleigh 27.2; Charleston, 37.5; Richmond, 29.7; Leadville, Col., 28.7; Shreveport, La., 45.5; Key West, 28.4; Petersburg, Va., 31.1; Lynchburg, Va., 27.7. These are only typical. I could name dozens of others.

The Union troops in the Rebellion had worse things than this to face in their war. On p. 238 of the 1899 report of the Surgeon General of the United States Army, is a table comparing, month



## ATKINSON'S GHASTLY DEATH STATISTICS

to month, the admissions and deaths from disease in the first six months of the Rebellion and a like period of the Spanish War. Under the table are these remarks of the Surgeon General:

“That the prevalence and fatality of disease was greater during the civil war than in the regular army during the past year is evident from this tabulation. The highest monthly rate of admission during the civil war was 363.66, furnished by August, 1861; the highest rate during the past year was 271.79, calculated from the admissions in September. The mean monthly rate during the eight months tabulated was 287.98 in 1861, while in 1898 the mean rate was only 185.98. It may be observed, also, that the maximum rate of last year was not so large as the mean rate of the eight months of the civil war, and further, that the mean monthly rate of the 5 years of the civil war June 30, 1861, to June 30, 1866, was higher than the mean rate of the regular army during the eight months which included its disastrous experience with the climatic and febrile diseases of the West Indies. The civil war rate referred to was 197 per 1000 men; the Spanish-American war rate, as tabulated above, 185.91.”

The average of admissions for the first eight months of the civil war, if carried out for a year, is 3455 sick men reporting from each 1000 men. That is a sick rate of more than 800 higher than

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

the worst yearly report we have yet had from the Philippines,—or, to put it another way, there would be four men ill in the first year of the Civil War to three in the Philippines in the Spanish War.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE VENEREAL DISEASE LIBEL

#### VENEREAL DISEASES

BUT, not content with attempting to frighten the parents and friends of those boys out there with false prophecies, Mr. Atkinson had to horrify and shame every woman they knew, had to thrust before the loving eyes of the mothers, sisters and sweethearts of the 100,000 men we sent out there, prophecies that they can probably never forgive. We can spend but a moment in going over this, but it seems so scandalous, so libelous, so wanting in common decency that I am not at liberty to let it altogether pass.

First I shall take the No. 2 of the Anti-Imperialist and turn to p. 18:

“The greatest and most unavoidable danger to which these forces will be exposed will neither be fevers nor malaria; it will be venereal diseases in their worst and most malignant form. It is this which has reduced the population of Hawaii to a de-

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

generated remnant, 4 per cent. of whom are isolated under sentence of death from leprosy; a disease of a similar type, perhaps not from the same cause, which gives evidence of the utter degeneracy of these poor people."

On p. 21, Vol. II we read:

"About 13,000 soldiers return to England from India every year, and of these, in 1894, over 60 per cent. had suffered some form of venereal disease. These figures are quoted as showing more forcibly than words can, the risk of contamination, not only to the present population of this country, but also to its future generations. Of these men a number die, or remaining invalids are more or less incapacitated from earning their own livelihood, and thus become a burden on the rates."

Now here are some of his statistics—are two pages of them (Anti-Imp., vol. 2, pp. 24-5) which Mr. Atkinson says were taken from the parliamentary blue book, 1896, showing the venereal diseases in 1896 in the British army:

"Admissions to hospital per 1000 men in service: In India, as a whole, in 1896, 522.3; In Rohilkhand, 711.8; In Jhansi, 859.9; (nearly nine men out of 10.) In Newgong, 1013.5 (every man)."

And then on p. 20 of the same number of the Anti-Imperialist (No. 2) Mr. Atkinson quotes the

## THE VENEREAL DISEASE LIBEL

following from the parliamentary report, East India (contagious diseases) No. 1 and No. 3 (1897). It is a picture of what a committee of the English parliament saw among some English troops, and Edward Atkinson, out of kindness to the mothers of our boys in the Philippines, quotes it here as showing what they must expect to see when their boys come home. As I read it I want you to remember if you have seen any of our returning soldiers whom it would describe.

Vol. II, p. 20:

“Before reaching the age of twenty-five years, these young men have come home presenting a most shocking appearance; some lay there having obviously but a short time to live; others were unrecognizable from disfigurement by reason of the destruction of their features, or had lost their palates, their eyesight, or their sense of hearing; others again were in a state of extreme emaciation, their joints distorted and diseased. Not a few are time-expired, but cannot be discharged in their present condition, incapacitated as they are to earn their livelihood, and in a condition so repulsive that they could not mix with their fellowmen. Their friends and relatives refuse to receive them and it is inexpedient to discharge them only to seek the asylum of the poorhouse; so they remain at Netley in increasing numbers which, as matters now are, seem likely to continue to increase.”

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

What a picture that is to thrust in the faces of the parents of our boys! Now, what are the facts about this matter? In a word, they are as follows:

In the year 1898, it was unnecessary to discharge a single soldier in the Philippines for these troubles—not one, from a force whose mean strength was 2903 (Vide 1899 Rep. Surg. Gen., U. S. A., p. 335), and, taking our army as a whole during 1898, it is found that the admission rate to sick report for these diseases was only 3 (three) men higher in each 1000 than it was in our army during the ten years from 1887 to 1898—and in those ten years we had five men constantly ill of these troubles to less than four in 1898.

In 1899 we had to discharge only 50 men out of the 39,000 in the Philippines for this trouble,—one man in 780; and in 1900 only 47 out of an average army of 66,882 men—one man in 1423!—showing an improvement in the Philippines of nearly 100 per cent. over the year 1899; while from as much of our army as never left the United States at all in that year (1899), we discharged over 3.5 men to the 1000; that is, in 1899, we had to discharge more than three men suffering from these diseases from

## THE VENEREAL DISEASE LIBEL

the army serving in the United States to one man from the army serving in the Philippines!

In 1900, in the Philippines we had to discharge, for these troubles, 47 men out of an average army of 66,882 men—one in about 1400—while in the United States we had to discharge 151 men out of a force less than one-third as great as the force in the Philippines ; which means that, in 1900, we had to discharge more than ten men to every 1400 in our army at home while, in the army in the Philippines we had to discharge only one in the same number ; and our rate of discharge for these disorders in the United States is the lowest, I am informed, of all the armies of the world and has been so for many years. (Vide 1900 Rpt. Surg. Gen., pp. 384 and 387,—also 1901 Rpt, idem, pp. 334 and 340.)

The above is an indication of our showing in the Philippines for the first three years of our campaign there. At no time within those three years were these diseases the “greatest” danger which our soldiers had to face. As illustrative of the average prevalence of these disorders, attention is directed to page 131 of the 1901 Surg. Gen. Rep., which shows that, according to the latest information contained therein, there was, from June, 1900, to April,

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1901, out of every seven men on sick report in the Philippines, one man, on the average, who suffered from venereal disease,—so that this danger to the soldiers—the danger which Mr. Atkinson says is the “greatest”—was, for the last nine months given in the 1901 report, just one-seventh as prevalent as other diseases.

Since the making up of the 1901 report, we, at times, have fallen off in this excellent showing a little, but not to any degree that warrants the application of any such statistics or pictures as Mr. Atkinson gives. The most unfavorable exhibit our army appears to have made in the Philippines, as a whole, in these matters is in the letter to me of May 8, 1892, from the Asst. Surgeon General, from which quotation was made in the preceding chapter. That letter states as follows:

“Twenty-one per cent. of all the totality of disease and injury (in the Philippines) for March, 1902, consisted of venereal cases,—i. e., 21 per cent. of 6.45 per cent. (the total sick rate for March) or 1.35 per cent. or 13.5 (men afflicted with) venereal (diseases) per 1000 of strength.”

Thirteen men to the 1000 afflicted in this way,—about one man in 100,—less than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.!



## THE VENEREAL DISEASE LIBEL

13 men to the 1000! Something of a contrast to the English rate which Mr. Atkinson so gleefully quotes, of 43 for each 1000 men in India in 1896!

The 1902 report of the Surgeon General, which is just at hand, shows that, for the calendar year 1901, the rate of admission to sick report for these diseases in our own army at home was *five higher* than the corresponding rate in the Philippines—and we had to discharge only 26 men in the Philippines for these diseases out of an army of a mean strength of 59,526 men; while in the United States, here at home, we discharged 118 men out of a mean army of 26,515—that is, here among our troops stationed at home, we had to discharge for disability owing to these diseases 4.42 men in each 1000, and only .44 of a man to the 1000 in the Philippines—and, to sum it all up so that we may grasp the general result quickly, comprehensively, and conclusively, I add that the Surgeon General's reports show that, in the four years of the Philippine struggle, the average annual rate of admission to sick report for these diseases in our army in the Philippines has been 4 (four) men per thousand less than the average annual rate of admissions during the same period for the same diseases in our army here at

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*home!* So that Mr. Atkinson's labored delusions fall to the ground of their own weight.

Let us hope Mr. Atkinson will learn that statistics of the English army in India do not apply to our American army in the Philippines!

I think these facts prove that Mr. Atkinson has overdrawn his picture, and that it was without reasonable excuse. He can find here and there statements of individual officers and men to comfort him a little, and statements from isolated posts that will please him, but nothing can disturb the general results that are established and the figures I have just given. As Mr. Atkinson was only prophesying and comparing, it cannot be proven that he misstated,—but it is asserted that his comparisons were unfair, uncalled for, unwarranted, exaggerated and distorted, and so much so, that, considering the delicacy of the subject and the pride and anxiety of the families of these boys for their soldier sons, Mr. Atkinson has shown a marked lack of good taste, of gentlemanly conduct and of decent respect for the soldier.

Before leaving this branch of our discussion, I would like to ask Mr. Atkinson for any statistics he may be able to furnish of the prevalence of these dis-

## THE VENEREAL DISEASE LIBEL

eases among men, without excepting anybody at all, engaged in Mr. Atkinson's business, that of fire insurance—if I may so ask without prying too far into his personal affairs. But, as he has seen fit to impute to the soldiers with so free a hand, it would seem only fair for me, in their behalf, to ask for any testimony Mr. Atkinson is willing to furnish.

## CHAPTER IX

### ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

#### HOW ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST THE LIVES OF AMERICAN SOLDIERS

BUT there was a dangerous side to the work of these Anti-Imperialists. Their work cost the lives of American soldiers. There is no reasonable doubt about that. Their work cost the lives of hundreds of American soldiers,—stabbed in the back as they stood out there on the firing line, by their own countrymen.

Soldiers were encouraged and urged to desert by the Anti-Imperialists; and it meant death to a soldier to desert in time of war. Letters went from this country to the leaders of the enemy urging them to hold out a little longer,—that is, to keep on shooting down our soldiers; for that's what urging an enemy to keep on a little longer means, if it means anything. "Keep on shooting down our men and if you can only shoot enough of them, the people of

## ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

the United States will withdraw their troops, and then you can put Aguinaldo in power!" That, the Anti-Imperialists told you, would give the Filipinos their freedom.

The Philippine Commission told Mr. McKinley that if Aguinaldo were put in power and we withdrew our troops, it would be nothing but anarchy in those islands. The men who reported that were Mr. Schurman, Mr. Denby, Admiral Dewey, General Otis and Professor Worcester. They all spent many months there. Mr. Edward Atkinson, who runs a fire insurance business in Boston and turns out such statistics as we have examined in these pages, says in effect, that the men on this commission do not know what they are talking about!

All up and down this great country the Anti-Imperialists made speeches of sympathy for the men who were shooting at our own soldiers. It is said that money was collected here and dispatched to that enemy, and I am informed, and I believe it is true, much, if not substantially all of such funds were employed to buy guns, powder and bullets to be turned against American soldiers. These people sent their speeches of encouragement and good cheer to that enemy and these documents were pla-

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carded and distributed all over the Philippines to encourage the mob in Aguinaldo's army to keep up the fight a little longer, as their Anti-Imperialist allies in the United States were becoming stronger every day and it was represented to the Filipinos that if they could only keep up the fight long enough their cause would be triumphant, as the United States would eventually have an Anti-Imperialist President. Can one hardly imagine anything that would have stiffened up an enemy more than to receive just such news as that?

There can be no reasonable doubt but that the insurrection would have been over long before it was if it had not been for just this sort of aid,—this “blow from behind.” I believe this can be demonstrated.

### DOCUMENTS CAPTURED BY FUNSTON SHOWING ANTI-IMPERIALIST AID TO AGUINALDO

Among a mass of material bearing upon this point which I have collected for several years there are some statements to which attention is asked. I desire to exhibit to you some of the evidence itself. The documents from which quotations are made are

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papers which, for the most part, I am informed, are now on file in the War Department in Washington. I believe the most of them were captured by General Funston when he discovered the hiding place of Aguinaldo's private papers. Here are the translations. You can here see positively whether the hostile Filipinos were encouraged or not by their Anti-Imperialist allies and partners in the United States.

In October, 1899, Aguinaldo published a signed manifesto in *La Independencia*, the insurgent organ of Manila, in which he said:

“We ask God that He may grant the triumph of the Democratic party in the United States, which is the party which defends the Philippines, and that Imperialism may cease from its mad idea of subduing us with its arms.”

How delighted the Anti-Imperialists must have been to have learned of this! How they must have glowed with pride! The prayer should have been changed so that it would read this way:

“We ask God that He may grant the triumph of the Anti-Imperialist party in the United States, which is the party which defends the Philippines and which is doing all it can to aid us who are at war with their country.”

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

The next is an order that was, apparently, widely distributed:

"In the United States meetings and banquets have been held in honor of our honorable President, Don Emilio Aguinaldo, who was proclaimed by Mr. Bryan, the future President of the United States, as one of the heroes of the world.

"The Masonic society, interpreting the unanimous desire of the people, together with the Government, organizes a meeting and popular assembly in this capital in favor of the national independence, which will take place on Sunday the 29th, in honor of Mr. Bryan and the Anti-Imperialist party which defends our cause in the United States.

"All the Masons and all the Filipino people are called to take part in this solemn act. The meeting will be composed of three parts: First. At eight in the morning on the 29th, a gathering in an appropriate place will take place, which will begin by singing the national hymn; then appropriate speeches will be read. Second. At midday a banquet will take place in the palace in honor of Mr. Bryan, who will be represented by American prisoners. Third. At four in the afternoon a popular manifestation will take place everywhere—the people will decorate and illuminate their houses, bands of music will pass through the streets.

[SEAL] "THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR.

TARLAC, October 27, 1899.

"To all the provincial, local and military commanders in this capital, Nuncia Capas, Bangbang, Gerona, Panique, and Victoria, the president of the



## ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

audiencia of Bavambang and the editor of *La Independencia*."

How would a Northern man have felt to have been banqueted, wined and dined by Jefferson Davis and his Cabinet in 1863? This is about a parallel case. These enemies of ours who were actually at war with us were giving banquets to some of our own people and celebrating the occasion with bands, illuminations and decorations!

Here is something more of a similar nature. It is the translation of another poster that was put up all over the city of Tarlac, one of the principal cities of Luzon, and through the surrounding country:

### AN ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN

Will be held on the 2d of November, 1899,  
in the

THEATER OF TARLAC,  
in honor of

THE NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE  
and of those among

The American People Who Sympathize with the  
Filipino Nation.

PROGRAMME.

FIRST PART.

(6 A. M.)

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

REVEILLE—Bands of music will march through the city.

(8 A. M.)

Opening Number—National March.

Opening Address by the President.

Reading of Telegrams.

Speeches and Poems.

Donations for the Wounded in the Campaign.

HYMN—AGUINALDO-BRYAN.

Two-Step—La Independencia.

SECOND PART.

(4 P. M.)

General Celebration.

I presume there would be quite a sale of that hymn, Aguinaldo-Bryan, among our Anti-Imperialists if it were to be published here.

All these documents bear out the following testimony of the Hon. John Barrett, in a recent signed article in the *Review of Reviews*;

“Following up all these unhappy influences to which our army and navy had to quietly submit without turning a finger, there came the blow from behind that did more harm than all of these local influences combined—the agitation in America in behalf of the Filipinos and in opposition to the policy of our government and of the army and navy as advised by such tried men as Admiral Dewey and General Otis. It is remarkable how quickly the idea spread, not

## ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

only through the Filipino army, but among the people in the distant interior, that the United States was wavering in its policy, and that it was probable that if they held out long enough and persisted in their position we would withdraw our army and give them back the islands.

“Every discordant note that was struck in America was telegraphed or written either to Hong Kong or Manila and found its way by first opportunity to the camps of the Filipino army and to the columns of the native press. Not satisfied, however, with the circulation given by the newspapers, what was being said and done in America was printed in circular and pamphlet form and sent among the people to encourage them. If the senior senator of Massachusetts could have witnessed the expression of satisfaction depicted on the face of every Filipino soldier when he read the sentiments expressed by that distinguished man in the halls of congress, and then had seen the look of pain upon the face of every American soldier when he realized that a United States senator was inspiring the enemy opposite him, I am of the humble opinion that he would have experienced some feeling of regret at the direct effect of his argument.

“I heard not only Admiral Dewey and Maj.-Gen. Otis, but Gens. MacArthur, Anderson, Hale, Lawton, Brig. Gen. Otis and Cols. Smith and Summers use terms as strong as I have on this unhappy feature of the war.”

Here is another letter with regard to the same matter, from one of Aguinaldo's secretaries to another:

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"Filipino Republic, Sec. of Foreign Affairs:

"Wishing to hold a meeting in the morning of Sunday next in the Presidential Palace of this republic to correspond with the one held in the United States by Mr. Bryan, who toasted our honorable president as one of the heroes of the world, and with the object of carrying this out with the utmost pomp and with contributing by the presence of your subordinates to its greater splendor, I would be obliged if you would come to see me for a conference upon this matter.

"May God keep you many years.

"TARLAC, October 26, 1899.

"FELIPE BUENCAMINO,  
"The Secretary."

Here is the translation of a report from a provincial chief to Aguinaldo's Secretary of War, showing how our enemies in his province regarded the news from America:

"SECRETARY OF WAR, Tarlas:

"PROVINCIAL CHIEF ZAMBELE.—Received your circular. (The order just above, calling for the general organization of these banquets and celebrations). The circular was received with animation and patriotic enthusiasm by the people gathered in a great reunion in government house. We had early this morning a gathering of civil and military officers and private persons to celebrate the independence of the country and in honor of Mr. Bryan and at four p. m. we shall have the second part of

## ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

the meeting. We all join in congratulating our honorable president, the government, and the army.

“PROVINCIAL CHIEF ZAMBELE.”

The comfort and aid offered by the Anti-Imperialists to the enemy who were shooting our soldiers were received with “great animation and patriotic enthusiasm.” What a motto to put up in an American home!—to be seen by the mother of a boy who had been killed in the Philippines!

In the spring of 1899 our forces captured a Philippine city of some 17,000 inhabitants. Upon taking possession, our soldiers found the following poster (in Spanish) posted up in all the prominent places from one end of the city to the other:

“From the provincial chief of this province received to-day, the 9th of December, the tenor of which is as follows:

““I have the great pleasure of informing your excellencies that you may in your town cause to be publicly known that data according to the foreign newspapers very strongly favorable to the independence of our fatherland exists in the fact that the party of the North American people which calls itself the Democratic party, preserving unimpaired its ancient principles and traditional institutions by which it obtained in the past century the independence of its own country, emancipating it from England, sustains and defends to-day with ardor the declaration of independence of the Philippines and

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that the Massachusetts periodical having the widest circulation among the agriculturists of the country known under the name of *The Farm and Home*, having interested its subscribers in the subject, asked that they manifest themselves in favor of the independence of the Philippines or their annexation, with the following results:

Section.	For independence	For annexation
New England . . . . .	1,277	785
Middle States . . . . .	8,888	2,343
Central West . . . . .	4,901	3,102
Southern States . . . . .	1,792	1,083
Pacific Coast . . . . .	1,684	1,103
Total . . . . .	18,524	8,416

“ ‘ May Providence decree that in the election for the President of the United States the Democratic party, which defends us, shall triumph, and not the imperialistic party, which is headed by Mr. McKinley, and which attacks us.’ ”

The following appears to have been distributed all through the islands:

“ The great Democrat, Dr. Bryan, one of the most eminent men of the United States, is assured that he will be the future President, and then our happy hours begin. There have also been celebrated in New York and Chicago great meetings and banquets in honor of our dearly beloved president, Sr. Agui-

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naldo, who was entitled one of the world's true heroes.

"The masses who have thus voted in our favor have done the same with reference to Cuba, asking her independence, for which she is already to-day struggling.

"Finally, the conduct of the Filipino annexationists condemns itself. They have changed their flag, as they change their shirts, and are animated solely by momentary lust of stolen gold; but by their own vile conduct, aided by their thieving country, they are only raising their own scaffold.

"God guard your excellencies many years.

"GUINABATAN, December 4, 1899.

"SIG. DOMINGO SAMSON."

*La Independencia* was the Aguinaldo organ in the Philippines. Some extracts from its columns are:

"AN ADVERSARY OF MCKINLEY.

"Mr. Bryan, the competitor of McKinley in the last Presidential election and the candidate selected for the future by the Democratic party, has published a manifesto which has caused a profound sensation in the United States.

"Mr. Bryan announces himself decidedly opposed to the imperial policy of the Government, and shows the danger in which American institutions will be placed by this entirely new ambition for colonization. . . . He asks that the régime instituted in Cuba be applied to all the territory taken from Spain. . . .

"To place the American yoke on the millions of

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natives who wish to be free, 200,000 men will be needed." . . February 2, 1899.

"A great popular meeting was held in New York on February 23 to protest against the imperialistic policy of the United States." March 8, 1899.

"BRYAN SPEAKS.

"Mr. Bryan . . . declared at a great meeting at Denver that the United States could not institute a colonial policy. 'Imperialism,' he said, 'may increase our territory, but it will lower our ideals. It is a step backward, etc.'" March 28, 1899.

Now, luckily, at the time Funston made his important captures he found a lot of the correspondence which these Anti-Imperialists had been writing to Aguinaldo and his lieutenants. Those letters from Americans were afterward sent home with the letters from other Filipinos. I have a copy of some of these letters. I shall quote but one or two of them,—but they will show you the kind of work that was going on.

Here is one from a man whose name I suppress, for his sake, dated at Fort Hamilton, N. Y., July 17, 1899, addressed to Senor G. Apacible, Aguinaldo's agent and representative at Hong Kong:

DEAR FRIEND AND BROTHER: Our friend, Albert S. Parsons, of Lexington, (Albert S. Parsons is the



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Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League) gave me your name as one to whom I could write as a representative of the Filipinos. I am a member of the Anti-Imperialist League, of Boston. I have published many articles and letters denouncing the piratical war carried on by President McKinley against your people. He and General Otis and all his troops are pirates upon the territory of the natives.

I should like to suggest a plan to you. It is this: You should seize some official of rank in service of the United States and then inform the foreign consuls that he was to be brought before a council of war for piracy, and write to said consuls to have representatives present at such council of war to see that it is legal."

This is giving aid and comfort to an enemy. A man by the name of André was once hung by a man by the name of George Washington in this country for suggesting to an American officer a plan of procedure.

Here is another one, written by an Anti-Imperialist, showing a conspiracy between him and a Filipino to deliberately deceive the American people into action founded upon the belief that Dewey and Aguinaldo were allies:

"The vital thing, and nothing else counts, is what Dewey said and did when he last met Aguinaldo. That, that, that is the thing; all else is empty wind.

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The sole thing to have impressed upon the public in America would be the chaining of Dewey and Aguinaldo together as participators in common action; you surely comprehend what this means. Think and think again. It means success, as far as possible."

DOCUMENTS SHOWING FILIPINO POLICY AS DECLARED  
BY THEMSELVES. THEY CO-OPERATE WITH  
ANTI-IMPERIALISTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Here is perhaps the most important document of all. It is a letter from Felipe Agoncillo, then Aguinaldo's representative in Paris, to G. Apacible and I. Santos, at that time Aguinaldo's agents in Hong Kong. Extracts from that letter are as follows:

"Paris, June 23, 1899.

"Taking into serious consideration the present condition of affairs, *I am convinced the political tactics of our government must be the following:*  
*1st. To prolong the war as much as possible . . .*  
*2nd. Under every circumstance the armed intervention of any power must be avoided because it would lead only to fatal divisions. 3rd. Foment the actions of the Democratic party of the United States which advocates our independence—I am doing this in the way it seems fitting to me. . .*  
*4th. I do not think the time has come to forward diplomatic notes to the chancelleries for if this was done at the present time and was known in the United States, it would undoubtedly cause a unification of national feel-*

## ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

ing. The Democratic and Republican parties would unite and our triumph would then be doubtful.

"5th. Observe strictly international law as applying to public and to private rights including its precepts covering persons and property of neutral foreigners avoiding the slightest cause for complaint on our part in order not to destroy the favorable aspect in which we are, fortunately, now regarded by them. I think it important that our government should constantly send to all our Commanders circulars charging them to treat with respect the persons and property of foreigners (not Yankees) and ordering the most rigid observance of the laws of war, publishing such circulars in the vicinity, and sending them to all the Consuls in Manila and to me for publication in the press everywhere.

"Finally, the impossibility of the United States to conquer the Philippines by force and the opinion of European nations, favorable to our cause, are going to be the principal factors in our triumph." \*

That letter, in my judgment, shows the exact situation. Aguinaldo's whole campaign, and that of the insurgents who followed him, appear to have been clearly predicated upon Anti-Imperialist sentiment here at home. This letter from Agoncillo almost proves that, if language has any meaning. All the evidence here presented goes to support that view.

\* *Italics are by me.*—F. C. C.

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While here is the silent, unimpeachable testimony of the dead. It cannot be gainsaid. It is the judgment, written down at the time and on the ground, of a great American soldier. On Oct. 6, 1899, Gen. Lawton wrote a letter to John Barrett. See how the hand of fate crept unseen over his shoulder and guided the pen, as he wrote:

"I wish to God that this whole Philippine situation could be known by everyone in America as I know it. If the real history, inspiration and conditions of this insurrection, and the influences, local and external, that now encourage the enemy, could be understood at home, we would hear no talk of unjust 'shooting of government' into the Filipinos or hauling down our flag in the Philippines. . . . *If the so-called anti-imperialists in Boston would honestly ascertain the truth on the ground, and not in distant America, they, whom I believe to be honest men misinformed, would be convinced of the error of their statements and conclusions and of the unfortunate effect of their publications here. If I am shot by a Filipino bullet, it might just as well come from one of my own men.*

. . . . *These are strong words, and yet I say them because I know from my own observation, confirmed by the stories of captured Filipino prisoners, that the continuance of fighting is chiefly due to reports that are sent out from America and circulated among these ignorant natives by the leaders who know better.*" \*

\* Italics are by me.—F. C. C.

## ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

Two months later, while standing up to his full height in the middle of a kneeling file of men out on the firing line, dressed all in white, a giant figure that was a target for every hostile marksman, a bullet plunged into his heart, and, with a single gasp, the great soldier was gone. Think of the message he sends ringing into the ears of the Anti-Imperialists here at home! *"If I am shot by a Filipino bullet, it might as well come from one of my own men!"*

Here is another light on the present situation. It comes from one in whose proven bravery and dash the American people have cause for just pride. I think that the following extract from an address made before the Marquette Club, in Chicago, on the 11th of March, 1902, taken in conjunction with the evidence over which we have already gone, proves that the insurrection in the Philippines would probably have ended long before it did, if we could only have kept the Anti-Imperialists quiet at home:

"Had it not been," said Gen. Funston, "for the so-called peace-party in the States, the insurrection would have been suppressed finally in January, 1900. Since that time 600 lives have been sacrificed and millions of dollars have been spent. *Were it not for the hope of the few leaders still under*

## THE BLOW FROM BEHIND

*arms that the United States is on the verge of a civil war in their behalf all resistance would be at an end. . . .*

The responsibility for the continuance of the resistance to our army should be placed where it is due. *From the lips of Aguinaldo himself and from other leaders of the insurrection, I know that for the last two years they have been encouraged to shoot down our men and continue their warfare by the copperhead sentiments of people here in the States."*\*

That testimony of Gen. Funston is certainly in line with Agoncillo's statement that "taking into consideration the present conditions of affairs, the political tactics of (Aguinaldo's) our government must be the following: 1st: To prolong the war as much as possible . . . and to foment the actions of the Democratic party in the United States, which advocates our independence. I am doing this in the way it seems fitting to me."

I believe the indictment is complete. I think the chain is a whole one. I believe every link is there, and, if so, then, unless all this testimony is false, unless John Barrett, Gen. Lawton, Gen. Funston, Admiral Dewey, Gens. Otis, MacArthur, Anderson, Hale, and Col. Smith and Col. Summers have delib-

\* Italics are by me.—F. C. C.

## ANTI-IMPERIALISM COST LIVES

erately misstated—then the Anti-Imperialists should be charged with the lives of many an American soldier. If the foregoing statements are true, and I believe they are, there is no escape from such a conclusion.

Then it is wrong! Then it is wicked! Then it is a crime!—because it encourages an enemy to shoot down an American soldier.

## CHAPTER X

### NO SOLDIERS AMONG ANTI-IM- PERIALISTS

WHEN I first began to collect the material for this work, now over two years ago, I was puzzled to find an explanation of how it was that these Anti-Imperialists could not see what was perfectly evident to our soldiers, that, by encouraging the enemy, the Anti-Imperialists were striking our soldiers "a blow from behind,"—and it is only recently that I have found a reason that is satisfactory to my mind. Just as I was about giving up discovering a reasonable solution of the problem, the idea struck me all of a sudden that only those who had never been American soldiers would stab them in the back and, apparently, not know that any blow had been struck. It must be ignorance of the soldier's life.

A hasty glance through a list of the officers of the Anti-Imperialists showed me that the New England Anti-Imperialist League had a president, a



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treasurer, secretary and an executive committee of four; in all, seven active officers. Among these there was not a single old soldier and I believe every one of the seven was an able-bodied man at the time of the Rebellion. Then I counted up and I found that they had 32 vice-presidents, and in that list of 32 there were, as near as I could ascertain (and I looked them up as far as I have been able in the limited time at my disposition) just two old soldiers, neither one of whom had carried a musket,—both had been commissioned officers,—so that of the 39 officers of the league, there were two soldiers. It began to look as if I had the right explanation at last!

Then I went farther. I visited the library of the most prominent newspaper in Boston,—one that gave the Anti-Imperialists more space than any other,—and I hunted up the accounts of the nine public meetings the Anti-Imperialists had had,—eight in Boston and one in Cambridge. In these accounts of these meetings, I found the mention of just 203 names of men who sat on the platform, presided, made speeches, wrote letters, offered resolutions, were officers of the organization or were noticed in the audience. Among these 203 there

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are duplications but, as that will not affect the general results, I have not sifted them out one by one. I know a number of these 203 men personally and a great many more by sight and reputation. Many of them stand very high in my own profession—that of the law. They are all, I should say, without exception, men of money and high standing. I have spent considerable time in reading up the history of many of these men whom I didn't know, and after examining them all with considerable care, I can find just three out of the whole 203 that are the names of men who were in the Rebellion;—and two of these three were the two vice-presidents I have mentioned before; and all of the three were commissioned officers:—and I believe every one of the whole 203 was an able-bodied man in 1861.

I cannot find a man in the 203 who carried a musket; and he is the man who knows what war is,—the private and the non-com. He bears the brunt of it,—and I'll say now that I don't believe they can show us the name of such a man now in his right mind who is on their membership rolls or a contributor to their funds! It would be unnatural. It seems as if the stay-at-homes when

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danger comes were the men out of whom we make Anti-Imperialists. They are the first in peace and the last in war.

And here is a curious fact: the principal representative of the Filipinos in this country was, during the past year, in Boston, for many weeks. For much of the time, he was, I am informed, the guest of a representative of one of our oldest families. If Aguinaldo comes to the United States he will, it is already asserted in Boston newspapers, be received in the home of this Bostonian as the George Washington of the Filipinos.

My information is, and I would expect to find it true, that this Boston gentleman's father was a Copperhead in the Rebellion and his grandfather a Tory in the Revolution. The consistency of the family record is now upheld by the present Anti-Imperialist. I would not be surprised if this will be found to be true of the many of the Bostonians who are members of the Anti-Imperialist League, if the records be searched. I think I know offhand of several cases in which this would be true.

## CHAPTER XI

### ABRAHAM LINCOLN ON ANTI- IMPERIALISM

WAR draws lines. The moment the first hostile shot is fired at an American soldier, every American who is not for the soldier is against him. The statute of limitations applies at that instant and no true American will, from that time until our soldiers are out of danger, do anything knowingly that will increase the danger to them. To do that is a crime, as it leads to their death.

I am taking high ground on this matter,—yes, very decided ground. But I am supported by very eminent authority; by the man who knew more about the effects of Copperheadism and Anti-Imperialism than, probably, any other of his time. Abraham Lincoln knew what the “blow from behind” meant, and I consider that he and one of his foremost generals spoke the deciding, the last word on this question.

As I consider the history and career of Copper-

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"headism and of Anti-Imperialism, I am constantly reminded of these verses of Mr. Lincoln's favorite poem, "O, Why Should the Spirit of Mortal be Proud" :

"So the multitude goes, like the flower or the weed  
That withers away to let others succeed;  
So the multitude comes, even those we behold,  
To repeat every tale that has often been told.

"For we are the same our fathers have been;  
We see the same sights our fathers have seen,—  
We drink the same stream and view the same sun,  
And run the same course our fathers have run.

"They died, ay! they died; and we things that are now,  
Who walk on the turf that lies over their brow,  
Who make in their dwelling a transient abode,  
Meet the things that they met on their pilgrimage  
road."

Let us see how true this little poem is that Mr. Lincoln used to keep softly mumbling to himself when he was overburdened with worry, disappointment and responsibility.

The question of Copperheadism reached its height in the case of Vallandigham. After his defeat at Fredericksburg, Gen. Burnside took command of the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863.

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“He found,” say Nicolay and Hay in their exhaustive history of Mr. Lincoln, Vol. VII, Chap. XII, “his department infested with a peculiarly bitter opposition to the Government and to the prosecution of the war, amounting, in his opinion, to positive aid and comfort to the enemy; and he determined to use all the powers confided to him to put an end to these manifestations, which he considered treasonable. . . . He issued, on the 13th of April, an order, which obtained wide celebrity under the name of General Order No. 38, announcing that ‘all persons found within our lines, who commit acts for the benefit of the enemies of our country, will be tried as spies or traitors, and, if convicted, will suffer death.’ In enumerating the offenses for which arrest would be made, he declared that ‘the habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department. Persons committing such offenses will be at once arrested, with a view to being tried as above stated, or sent beyond our lines into the lines of their friends.’”

I want you to note particularly now, if you will, the last part of the sentence,—that the guilty parties will be “tried (as spies or traitors) or sent beyond our lines *into the lines of their friends.*” This later becomes of importance.

For some years Clement L. Vallandigham had been a Democratic congressman from Ohio, but was repudiated by his constituents because of his sympathy with the South and was defeated for re-elec-

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tion during the progress of the war. In a speech delivered in the House of Representatives on the 14th of January, 1863, he said: "I was satisfied . . . that the secret but real purpose of the war was to abolish slavery in the States . . . and with it . . . the change of our present democratic government *into an imperial despotism.*"

Copperheads never seem to advance, whether in the time of the Rebellion or in that of the Spanish War. How that speech of Vallandigham's sounds like dozens we have read since the beginning of the war in the Philippines! The very name, Anti-Imperialists, means "against an Empire." Here is an extract from a speech by the distinguished president of the Anti-Imperialists delivered by him in Boston two years ago:

"I am here to plead for America and I have reached the point where I am ready to avow that the President intended from the opening of the war with Spain to transfer this Government from a republic to an Empire."

In a speech delivered at the Second Annual Meeting of the New England Anti-Imperialist League on November 24, 1900, the same gentleman said:

"He (Pres. McKinley) has entered upon an undertaking, beginning in the year 1898, if not earlier,

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which means nothing less than the subversion of this government—a change of its character from a republic to an empire. . . . Is it to be presumed that the President, when he extorted the Philippine Islands from Spain, had any other purpose than a purpose to change the government from a Republic to an Empire?”

Vallandigham would have used the same expressions. The fact that the Empire they prophesied forty years ago has not yet arrived, while the names of the men who saw it coming have long since been forgotten, fails to impress them. The moment there is a war they fairly bound out of their chairs and shout at the top of their voices that they won't go because they don't approve of the purpose of it, which purpose is to change this Government into an Empire.

So we have the same cry in 1898 that Vallandigham made in 1863. At a meeting at Mt. Vernon, O., Vallandigham called the President, “King Lincoln” and advised the people to come up together at the ballot-box and “hurl the tyrant from his throne.” Within a year and a half, a United States Senator on the floor of the Senate appears to have called Mr. McKinley, “William the First, Emperor of the United States and the Philippines.”



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For his sayings at these meetings, General Burnside had Vallandigham arrested under General Order No. 38, tried before a military commission and found guilty of the charge of "publicly expressing, in violation of General Order No. 38, his sympathy for those in arms against the Government of the United States, declaring disloyal sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to suppress an unlawful rebellion." They, therefore, sentenced him to be placed in close confinement in some fortress of the United States . . . there to be kept during the continuance of the war.

"But," say Nicolay and Hay, "before the finding of the commission was made public, George E. Pugh, as counsel for Vallandigham, applied to Judge Leavitt of the United States Circuit Court, sitting in Cincinnati, for a writ of habeas corpus. . . . The most noticeable feature of the trial was a written address from General Burnside himself in which he explained and defended his action." He said in part:

"If it is my duty and the duty of the troops to avoid saying anything that would weaken the army by preventing a single recruit from joining the ranks, by bringing the laws of Congress into disrepute, or by causing dissatisfaction in the ranks, it is equally the duty of every citizen in the department to avoid the same evil. If I were to find a man from the

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enemy's country distributing, in my camps, speeches of their public men that tended to demoralize the troops, or to destroy their confidence in the constitutional authorities of that government, I would have him tried and hung, if found guilty, and all the rules of modern warfare would sustain me. Why should such speeches from our own public men be allowed?"

There is the exact point. Why should we allow our public men to make speeches for which we would hang an enemy, if he made them? General Burnside's view was that, in time of war, everybody was included under one of two classes. "The simple words 'patriot' and 'traitor' are comprehensive enough," said he; and then he went on to say:

"Let them freely discuss the policy in a proper tone; but my duty requires me to stop license and intemperate discussion, which tend to weaken the authority of the Government and army; whilst the latter is in the presence of the enemy it is cowardly so to weaken it. . . . There is no fear of the people losing their liberties; we all know that to be the cry of demagogues and none but the ignorant will listen to it."

The United States Circuit Court refused to give Vallandigham his liberty and Vallandigham would have been in close confinement until the end of the

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war had it not been for Mr. Lincoln. He, however, commuted the sentence.

“The method of punishment which he chose,” say Nicolay and Hay, “was doubtless suggested by a paragraph in Burnside’s Order No. 38, which had mentioned, as a form of punishment for the declaration of sympathy with the enemy, deportation, ‘beyond our lines into the lines of their friends.’ He, therefore, . . . directed that Vallandigham be sent within the Confederate lines. This was done about a fortnight after the court martial. Mr. Vallandigham was sent to Tennessee, and, on the 25th of May, was escorted by a small cavalry force to the Confederate lines near Murfreesboro. After a short parley with the rebel videttes, who made no objection to receiving the prisoner, he was delivered into the hands of a single private soldier of an Alabama regiment.”

This action of Mr. Lincoln led to renewed uprisings of the Copperheads, and they poured in their memorials on Mr. Lincoln in a steady stream. To one presented to him by a large meeting in Albany, N. Y., he made a reply, in the course of which he said, among other things:

“He who dissuades one man from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle.”

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The opening sentence of No. 4 of the Anti-Imperialist reads thus:

"The main purpose of this number is to . . . stop the supplies of men for the maintenance or increase of the army of subjugation by such proofs of the evil conditions of that service as may prevent intelligent men from risking their lives or their health in the effort to deprive the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands of their liberty."

On p. 25 of No. 2 of the Anti-Imperialist, Mr. Atkinson says:

"Before the next Congress can be brought together it will become plain (that) . . . the way for the youth of the land to avoid disease and death in the tropics is by refusing to volunteer or to enlist in the army or navy of the United States."

These come squarely under Mr. Lincoln's statement.

Continuing, Mr. Lincoln said:

"Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak to arrest and punish him

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if he desert. I think that in such a case to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but, withal, a great mercy."

Mr. Lincoln is right. The "wily agitator" is the real culprit; and then, with that fine sense of humor which always characterized him, he drove home his point in this wise:

"Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting that the American people will, by means of military arrests during the rebellion, lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury and habeas corpus throughout the indefinite peaceful future, which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics, during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life."

In the meantime, the Democratic party of Ohio had nominated Vallandigham for Governor, and they asked Mr. Lincoln to allow Mr. Vallandigham to return to Ohio. Mr. Lincoln was a Yankee. He was a horse-trader by nature and he could win every time at a blind swap of jackknives. So he thought he would try a trade with these Ohio Democrats. He stated to them three propositions, with only two of which we need to concern ourselves:

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“2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase or favor the decrease or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion.”

“3. And that each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.”

After stating these propositions Mr. Lincoln made this offer to his correspondents—that if they would write their names “and nothing else” on the back of the President’s letter, committing themselves to these propositions, he would release Vallandigham—and *they would not sign it! They would not sign it!* If they had, they would have had to stop talking; and so Vallandigham continued his sojourn in a warmer climate,—which I presume some embittered people hope is still his fate,—and the Anti-Imperialists would not have signed it either. That reminds me of a cartoon I saw some time ago in a Western paper. It showed Aguinaldo, after his capture, in the act of signing the oath of allegiance to the United States. When he had affixed his signature, he turned to a group of Anti-Imperialists who were watching him,

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at the head of whom were Edward Atkinson and E. Erving Winslow, and said to them, as he held out the oath, and offered them his pen, "Here, boys, I've signed it. Now it's your turn" ; but they had swooned.

Now let me show you how far these Anti-Imperialists and Copperheads will go. Just as soon as Vallandigham had been left in Alabama, he started for Richmond, where he entered into conference with the highest Confederate officials. John B. Jones, a clerk in the rebel war office at Richmond, made the following entry in his diary on the 22d of June, 1863.

" (Mr. Vallandigham) says that if we can only hold out this year, that the peace party of the North would sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of political existence. He seems to have thought that our cause was sinking and feared we would submit, which would, of course, be ruinous to his party! But he advises strongly against any invasion of Pennsylvania, for that would unite all parties at the North, and so strengthen Lincoln's hands that he would be able to crush all opposition and trample upon the constitutional rights of the people. Mr. V. said nothing to indicate that either he or the party had any other idea than that the Union would be reconstructed under Democratic rule. The President (Davis) indorsed with his own pen on this document that in regard to invasion of the North

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experience proved the contrary of what Mr. V. asserted." (Jones, "A Rebel War Clerk's Diary," Vol. I., pp. 357, 358.)

He was conspiring with the Confederate Cabinet against his country; giving them his best judgment and any information he had! He was a common spy. The Anti-Imperialists, or Copperheads, would say that he was only "exercising the right of free speech." They do not see anything wrong about that. Those notes of that Rebel Clerk show that Vallandigham was an Anti-Imperialist and his very words, even, are exactly those of the Anti-Imperialist who sat in Congress thirty-five years later and said: "If the Philippines are not subdued by the time of the next election, they never will be; for McKinley will be swept out of power and the nation will then see to it that our army is withdrawn."

Vallandigham said "if (you) can only hold out this year, the peace party will sweep the Lincoln dynasty out of political existence." The similarity is still further continued when it is remembered that both Mr. Lincoln and Mr. McKinley were landed in the White House at their next respective elections by landslides, both of them.



## CHAPTER XII

### FORWARD

Now let us give a little consideration to the problem of the Philippines as it presents itself to-day. Despite all of this attack upon him, Mr. McKinley kept right on trying to establish order. The Anti-Imperialists raised a great hue and cry about our Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. They said we couldn't govern the Filipinos in the only way we now can, for the moment and under the circumstances, till they have learned how to guide their own ship,—they said our constitution forbade it.

Well, we need not discuss that. The United States Supreme Court has since decided that the Anti-Imperialists were wrong. But I want to set down one thought, *i. e.*, that if we have in this, the leading republic of the world, a constitution that forbids our extending a helping hand to any other people on the globe who are under the heel of a monarchy, who need an experienced hand to help them while they set up a government of their own,

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then there is something the matter with that constitution; and, further, we know enough about Thomas Jefferson, and Alexander Hamilton, and George Washington, and Samuel Adams, and Benjamin Franklin and all the rest of the immortals who had a hand in constructing it that if it prevents our helping a down-trodden neighbor, no matter how near or dear he may be to us, then they, unwittingly, made an error, for they would never have absolutely denied to others perhaps the only chance to secure that for which they themselves had been ready to die—and the United States Supreme Court has decided on this side of it and we have legally governed Cuba and Porto Rico for four years and have turned Cuba over to her own people, free and independent. We shall soon do the same for Porto Rico and we can do the same thing in the same way for the Philippines and we are, I believe, going to do that, too.

We can take hold with these Filipinos and help them set up a republic of their own, and then we are through with them until they need us again. I believe that that is and is to be the policy of the great majority of our countrymen. That is all that we have been trying to do, as I understand it from the start, and it is all that we are trying to do now.

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This was, I believe, Mr. McKinley's view when he decided that we should take the islands, and the only purpose he had in mind. Here are his words for that:

In his letter of acceptance of his second nomination for the presidency, he says:

"In March, 1900, earnestly desiring to promote the establishment of a stable government in the archipelago, I appointed the following civil commission: The Hon. William H. Taft, of Ohio; Prof. Dean C. Worcester, of Michigan; the Hon. Luke I. Wright, of Tennessee; the Hon. Henry C. Ide, of Vermont, and the Hon. Bernard Moses, of California." We had no better men whom we could send in the whole country. "My instructions to them contained the following: *You (the secretary of war) (1900 Rept. Secy. War, p. 72) will instruct the commission to devote their attention in the first instance to the establishment of municipal governments, in which the natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the rural communities shall be afforded the opportunity to manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and subject to the least degree of supervision and control which a careful study of their capacities and observation of the working of native control show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order and loyalty.*"

Is there any Imperialism about that? And those are, I understand, the orders under which that com-

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mission is working to-day. I am informed that those instructions have not been at all changed from that day to this. Making republics,—and we have been making three of them for four years—is not Imperialism. Mr. McKinley believed what his commission told him, when they said that unless we did stay in the Philippines now they would lapse into anarchy. “Very well,” said Mr. McKinley, in substance, “we’ll take charge of them temporarily; but as fast as you can do it with safety to the inhabitants, you must turn over the control to the Filipinos.” That is the substance of what I have just quoted. That is what it means, if it means anything.

### MR. MCKINLEY’S SECOND COMMITTEE. THE TAFT COMMISSION AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ITS MEMBERS

Take this last commission,—the Taft Commission. First, let us look at their qualifications. Are they men of sufficient learning, standing, and worth to warrant us in giving serious attention to what they tell us they see and to what they give us as their best judgment?

As President of the Commission, Mr. McKinley appointed Hon. Wm. H. Taft, of Ohio. He comes of a distinguished family, his father having been

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Attorney-General and Secretary of War in Grant's cabinet and, later, Minister to Austria and Russia under President Arthur. The President of the Philippine commission was born in Cincinnati in 1857. He is a graduate of Yale and the Cincinnati Law School. In '81 he was made Prosecuting Attorney of his home county; was soon after Internal Revenue Collector for the 1st District of Ohio; in '83 he resigned and took up the active practice of the law. In two years he was made Assistant Solicitor of Hamilton County. In '87 he was appointed by Governor Foraker to be Judge of the Superior Court of Cincinnati. In 1888 he was elected for a term of five years to that office. In 1890 he resigned to become Solicitor General of the United States under Harrison. In 1892 he was appointed by the latter to be United States Circuit Judge for the 6th Circuit. In '93 Yale conferred upon him the degree of LL. D. He is Senior Circuit Judge of the United States. In 1896 he was made Dean of the Law Dept. of the University of Cincinnati. He has been greatly honored by his fellow-lawyers and in '95 delivered the annual address before the National Bar Association.

Bernard Moses is the President of the University

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of California. He was born in 1846, graduated from the University of Michigan and afterwards spent several years in Europe in the Universities of Leipsic and Berlin. In '74 he was given the degree of Ph. D. at the University of Heidelberg. Soon after he was called to the Chair of History at Albion College, Michigan; then three years later he was offered and accepted the Chair of History and Political Economy at the University of California, which he occupied until his appointment to this commission. He is an author of highest standing on political questions and Professor Bryce says of his "Essay on the Constitution" that it is "the work of the age." He has delivered courses of lectures at different times at Cornell, University of Michigan, and University of Chicago. At the time of his appointment to this commission he was engaged upon the production of a work which students of history await with greatest impatience, called "The Colonial Systems of Different Nations."

Prof. Worcester was a member of the first Philippine Commission and his biography we have already gone over.

Hon. Luke I. Wright was born fifty-five years ago in Tennessee. He has there practiced law

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continuously and is well known in his profession as one of the ablest jurists in the South. He is a stanch Democrat and is the law partner of United States Senator Turley from that State.

Hon. Henry C. Ives was born in 1844 in Vermont, where he has lived ever since, except when in the service of his country elsewhere. He was graduated from St. Johnsbury Academy and then from Dartmouth. Immediately upon leaving the latter he became President of the Academy from which he first graduated. In 1870 he began to practice law in St. Johnsbury. He soon attained high rank in his profession. He became State Attorney for his home county, then went to the State Senate for four years, was President of the Republican State Convention, delegate to the National Convention; in 1891 he was appointed Commissioner of the United States to act with commissioners from England and Germany in settling land troubles in Samoa. His fitness for the place was so evident that he was chosen chairman of the joint commission. In '93 he was appointed Chief Justice of Samoa. The State of Vermont considers him one of her greatest sons.

Now, these are the men whom Mr. McKinley

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sent to the Philippines as his second commission. He took the precaution to send a second committee in order that he might minimize the chances of error. It is submitted that no abler men could have been found in the United States available for the service. As a testimony from the opposition on this point, I want to quote an editorial of the *Boston Globe*, under date of February 5, 1902, The *Boston Globe* is the leading Democratic paper in New England:

"We shall have to take it for granted, perhaps, that what Governor Taft says of the situation in the Philippines is correct. At any rate, that is all the testimony we have and it has been gotten with a great expense and with great thoroughness."

### TAFT COMMISSION'S REPORT TO MR. MCKINLEY

Now let us see what this commission told Mr. McKinley:

Here is an extract from their report which is found on pp. 80, 81, and 82 of the annual report of the secretary of war for the year 1900:

"Manila, August 21, 1900.

"Secretary of War,  
Washington, D. C.

"Replying to dispatch Commission reports:



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It has for two months and a half made diligent inquiries into conditions prevailing. Change of policy by turning islands over to a coterie of Tagalog politicians will blight their fair prospects of enormous improvement, drive out capital, make life and property—secular and religious—most insecure, banish by fear of cruel proscription considerable body of conservative Filipinos who have aided Americans in well-founded belief that their people are not now fit for self-government, and re-introduce the same oppression and corruption which existed in all provinces under Malolos government during the eight months of their control. *The result will be factional strife between jealous leaders, chaos, and anarchy and will require and justify active intervention of our government or some other.*

BERNARD MOSES.

DEAN C. WORCESTER.

LUKE I. WRIGHT.

HENRY C. IDE.

WILLIAM C. TAFT."

BOTH OF MR MCKINLEY'S COMMISSIONS AGREE  
UNANIMOUSLY ON FACTS.

This is just what the first commission, the Schurman commission, also told Mr. McKinley. Two commissions made up of the ablest men of both parties that Mr. McKinley could select,—and I have never heard even an opponent say that we could have selected better men—tell the president that the Filipinos *cannot* run a republic now. Mr. Edward

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Atkinson and his friends say that the Filipinos *can*. Now, on whose say so shall we act? This is about all there is to it. The American people must take somebody's word.

Mr. McKinley took the unanimous opinion of his two commissions. I expect the American people will do the same. In his letter of instructions to the second Philippine Commission (1900 Rep. Sec. War, p. 72), Mr. McKinley said:

"The articles of capitulation of the city of Manila on the 13th of August, 1898, concluded with these words. 'This city, its inhabitants, its churches, and religious worship, its educational establishments, and its private property of all descriptions are placed under the special safeguard of the faith and honor of the American army.' I believe that this pledge has been faithfully kept. As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the government of the United States to give protection for property and life, civil and religious freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippine Islands. I charge this commission to labor for the full performance of this obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their country, in the firm hope that through their labor all the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day when God gave victory to American arms at Manila and set their land under the sovereignty and the protection of the people of the United States."

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And in a speech at San Francisco, when he and Mrs. McKinley took the trip to the Pacific Coast two years ago that proved almost fatal to her, Mr. McKinley said:

“These Philippine Islands are ours, not to subjugate, but to emancipate; not to rule in the power of might, but to take to those distant people the principles of liberty, of freedom, of conscience and of opportunity that are enjoyed by the people of the United States.”

Now, I believe, that was Mr. McKinley's idea. Those were his words, and they are not capable of any misconstruction. Everybody who has studied Mr. McKinley at all knows that he meant what he said.

Events have proven that Mr. McKinley and the American Congress went into Cuba to free her people. Nobody disputes but that we went into Porto Rico for a like purpose. Is it improbable that the man who led us into those islands, and then ousted us practically out of them, went into the Philippines for the same reason—to free those people? Why is it more improbable in the case of the Philippines than in that of Cuba or Porto Rico? Indeed, in the face of our relinquishment of Cuba and Porto Rico

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and the carrying out to the letter of Mr. McKinley's promise of freedom to them, the improbability is that Mr. McKinley did not mean what he said when, in the case of the Philippines, he declared that we were there to take to their people "the principles of liberty (and) of freedom . . . that are enjoyed by the people of the United States."

If I am correct, and I have been at great care and inquiry to prove that I am, that we went into the Philippines with the fixed determination to give to those people their absolute freedom the first moment it appeared to be safe to so do, and that we have not changed that policy, then the Anti-Imperialists have no case, no ground upon which to stand, now, and never have had any. A distinguished Anti-Imperialist, perhaps I ought to say extinguished, for he has been very quiet for a long time, has said that "God never made the people who couldn't govern themselves," and, therefore, we should at once evacuate Manila and sail away. If a foreign power did not intervene to protect its own citizens, the Filipino could undoubtedly govern himself, for the remark just quoted is, I believe, entirely correct, although the application to which it is put does

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suggest that the mind that made it is like "a river one thousand miles long and six inches deep." *But what sort of a self-government would it be?* That is the point in which the civilized people of the earth are interested. Cannibals govern themselves. The half-ape creatures of the Australian bush govern themselves. The Eskimo governs himself and so do the wild tribes of Darkest Africa. But what sort of a government is it? Again, I say, that is the question—not only self-government, but an American kind of self-government, is what we demand of the Filipino before he can take entire charge of his own affairs. When he can demonstrate that he can guide a United States of the Philippines, this great nation of Franklin, of Washington, of Lincoln, of McKinley and, yes, of Roosevelt, the new American, will rise in the might of its glorious memories and deeds and turn the Philippine Islands, free and independent, over to their native inhabitants.

The guide for our course, thus far, is the language of that great man who has since paid the penalty of death for his greatness, his kindness, his love to please others, and whom we may call the Father of the Philippines, William McKinley:

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“ We shall continue, as we have begun, to open the schools and the churches, to set the courts in operation, to foster industry and trade and agriculture, and in every way in our power to make these people whom Providence has brought within our jurisdiction feel that it is their liberty and not our power, their welfare and not our gain, we are seeking to enhance. Our flag has never waved over any community but in blessing. I believe the Filipinos will soon recognize the fact that it has not lost its gift of benediction in its world-wide journey to their shores.”

The 1902 Report of the United States Philippine Commission, the advance sheets of which have been placed at my disposition, shows that we have over 1000 American men and women over there teaching school (p. 867)—that 200,000 Filipino children are already attending the primary schools (p. 871), that some 300 native young men and women are attending a normal school at Manila for the instruction of teachers (p. 873), and that night schools are being introduced all over the islands, which are attended by everybody, young and old, the highest and the lowest—“ including the municipal officers and sometimes the governors of provinces ” (Ibid., p. 887).

This report shows that the courts we have set up over there, members of whose judges are largely Filipinos, “ are teaching the people a needed lesson

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of subordination to law and that their rights of person and property can safely be reposed in the courts and will be vindicated and protected therein without resorting to violence; and this is a new condition in the Philippine Islands" (Ibid., p. 692).

The people are seeing for the first time what law and order in a free republic means. "Civil government was completely established in the Filipino provinces throughout the archipelago in July of this year, and since that time an American soldier has not been called upon once to discharge his weapon" (Ibid., p. 18).

We are building hundreds of miles of good roads, of sewers, of watermains. In 1901 there were twenty-four post-offices in all the Philippine Islands; now there are 160 (p. 35). We are teaching sanitation and enforcing its laws. We are introducing modern machinery. In a word, we are revolutionizing that country. It is being filled with the bustle of America, and the results above indicated show that we are being met more than half-way. A thousand Yankee schoolmasters and schoolmarm's enthusiastically at work in that land and among that people will inevitably revolutionize the Filipino.

Now, there is the work. What shall we do with

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it? Shall we drop it? Now that Mr. McKinley is dead, shall we adopt the "scuttle policy" that we would never have adopted while he was President? We shall make mistakes in performing our duty as Mr. McKinley saw it. We have made some already. That we shall make more is certain. No work of any magnitude can be done without mistakes. There will be recurrences of the insurrection. Some of our people will be murdered out there before our work is done; and if we go along, sometimes stumbling, to be sure, but always making progress, the Antis and the opposition that always kicks up against anybody that is really doing anything, will bark and snarl at us at every misstep. We shall have to have our dark, worrying, doubtful days. We shall keep bumping our heads. Shall we go on? What is the answer of the American people?

There is one reason why we cannot leave the Philippines till we have set up a sound republic there: and it is conclusive to me. That is because American soldiers have laid down their lives out there in the work, *and the American people should never, for a moment, question about the advisability or the necessity of completing a good work which was baptized with the blood of an American volunteer!*



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*The nation owes an obligation to the mothers of those who die at its behest to see to it that they do not die in vain.*

### COLONEL GUY HOWARD'S DEATH. HIS HEROIC LAST WORDS

Nearly four years ago, General Lawton was just starting his last great expedition over in the Philippines. His supplies had to be taken in to him by a river that ran through a hostile country, and, as his success or failure depended very largely upon the haste with which he could be furnished with his rations, the detail to rush these supplies in to him was of the greatest importance. Colonel Guy Howard, the eldest son of Maj. Gen. O. O. Howard, one of the great commanders of the Rebellion, was placed in charge of the work. Regardless of the almost certain consequences and of the warnings of his brother officers, Colonel Howard determined to push up to General Lawton in broad daylight, as he could thus save General Lawton ten or twelve precious hours if he could but break his way through; and, with a handful of companions, he was soon on his way, steaming along in a small launch that dragged

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far behind it in its wake the line of barges that carried the precious supplies.

All went well for a time, but as the stream grew narrower and ran along through banks hidden with deep, overhanging, tropical underbrush, there was suddenly a cruel, blinding, deadly volley fired into their very faces from the bank. Colonel Howard, who had been seated in the stern, fell forward on his face and one or two of his men dropped,—killed on the spot. But Colonel Howard struggled to his feet and then, standing there drawn up to his full height with his hand pressed convulsively to his breast in a vain endeavor to stop the life blood from spurting from a jagged hole in his lungs, he shouted with all his remaining strength, "Whatever happens to me, keep the launch going! Keep the launch going!"—and fell over—dead—his last thought of his unfinished duty.

But from up there beyond the stars where his heroic soul had already gone, Guy Howard saw his work done, for they kept the launch going and before the sun had set they brought her safely to her little haven around the hill, under the Stars and Stripes!

Our history records no grander death. His last

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thought was not of his wife, his little ones, his father, his mother, his sisters, or his brothers—but only of his duty. His dying words and his name should be emblazoned in letters of imperishable gold high up on the list of our most honored dead.

And this launch of State that carries the great Philippine people that America has just started out to plow seas unknown to her precious freight, but seas whose bays and currents and eddies and rocks, and shoals, and safe harbors, too, are perfectly familiar to our pilot at the wheel—as she sails out on her search for American freedom, American prosperity, American ways, a Christian religion, the little red schoolhouse, and the American home; I believe the orders of the American people to her representatives who direct that voyage will be Guy Howard's immortal words, "Keep that launch going! Keep that launch going!"

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